



Internal Network PenTest

TECHNICAL REPORT

PenTest Demo Client

June 10, 2023

<https://www.tru.ro/pentest.html>

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Assessment Project Team

Below is a list of contacts that were involved in this engagement. Should you have any questions pertaining to the content of this document or any project and non-project-related items, please feel free to reach out to the necessary project contacts.

Primary Point of Contact	
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Threat Severity Rankings

To assist the organization with prioritizing findings, the findings and observations have been categorized with threat severity rankings based on the following guidelines:

SEVERITY		DESCRIPTION
	Critical	A critical threat ranking requires immediate remediation or mitigation. Exploiting these vulnerabilities require a minimal amount of effort by the adversary but poses a significant threat to the confidentiality, integrity, and/or availability of the organization's systems and data. A successful compromise of findings of this ranking leads to access to multiple systems and/or several pieces of sensitive information.
	High	A high threat ranking requires immediate remediation or mitigation. Exploiting these vulnerabilities require a minimal amount of effort by the adversary but poses a significant threat to the confidentiality, integrity, or availability of the organization's systems or data. A successful compromise of findings of this ranking leads to access to a single access or limited sensitive information.
	Medium	A medium threat ranking requires remediation or mitigation within a short and reasonable amount of time. These findings typically lead to a compromise of non-privileged user accounts on systems and/or applications or denote a denial-of-service (DoS) condition of the host, service, or application.
	Low	A low threat ranking requires remediation or mitigation once all higher prioritized findings have been remediated. These findings typically leak information to unauthorized or anonymous users and may lead to more significant attacks when combined with other attack vectors.
	Informational	An informational threat ranking does not pose a significant threat to the environment and may just be findings that could potentially disclose valuable information but do not expose the organization to any technical attacks. Findings rated as informational may be useful for an attacker performing information gathering on the organization to leverage in other attacks, such as social engineering or phishing.

Discovered Threats

DISCOVERED THREATS		THREAT SEVERITY RANKINGS
Internal Network Penetration Test (14)		
IPv6 DNS Spoofing		Critical
Link-Local Multicast Name Resolution (LLMNR) Spoofing		Critical
Microsoft Windows RCE (BlueKeep)		Critical
NetBIOS Name Service (NBNS) Spoofing		Critical
Outdated Microsoft Windows Systems		Critical
SMBv1 Enabled		High
Weak Active Directory Account Password Policy		High
Anonymous FTP Enabled		Medium
Insecure Protocol - FTP		Medium
Insecure Protocol - Telnet		Medium
SMB NULL Session Authentication		Medium
SMB Signing Not Required		Medium
LDAP Permits Anonymous Bind Access		Low
Egress Filtering Deficiencies		Informational

MITRE ATT&CK Mappings

This section of the report contains details about the tactics, techniques, and procedures as defined by the MITRE ATT&CK Framework. For additional details relating to these tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs), TRU Solutions recommends that PenTest Demo Client visit the specific URLs provided within the table below. Furthermore, TRU Solutions has also elaborated on how these TTPs were used during the penetration test in this report's Penetration Test Narrative section.

TRU Solutions recommends PenTest Demo Client thoroughly leverage this report section to investigate and improve network security policies, procedures, and controls within the organization's environment. All of the attacks mentioned in this report section should have been detected and properly logged for investigation purposes by the organization.

MITRE ATT&CK®			
Time	Name	Tactic	TTPID
Mon, Jun 12, 2023 @ 10:21:05 AM CDT	Remote System Discovery	Discovery	T1018
Mon, Jun 12, 2023 @ 10:21:05 AM CDT	Active Scanning: Scanning IP Blocks	Reconnaissance	T1595.001
Mon, Jun 12, 2023 @ 10:21:05 AM CDT	Network Service Discovery	Discovery	T1046
Mon, Jun 12, 2023 @ 10:21:05 AM CDT	Brute Force: Password Guessing	Credential-access	T1110.001
Mon, Jun 12, 2023 @ 10:21:05 AM CDT	Network Service Discovery	Discovery	T1046
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Mon, Jun 12, 2023 @ 10:21:05 AM CDT	Network Service Discovery	Discovery	T1046
Mon, Jun 12, 2023 @ 10:21:05 AM CDT	Gather Victim Host Information: Software	Reconnaissance	T1592.002
Mon, Jun 12, 2023 @ 10:21:05 AM CDT	System Information Discovery	Discovery	T1082
Mon, Jun 12, 2023 @ 10:21:05 AM CDT	System Owner/User Discovery	Discovery	T1033
Mon, Jun 12, 2023 @ 10:21:05 AM CDT	Brute Force: Password Spraying	Credential-access	T1110.003
Mon, Jun 12, 2023 @ 10:21:05 AM CDT	Brute Force: Password Guessing	Credential-access	T1110.001
Mon, Jun 12, 2023 @ 10:21:05 AM CDT	Brute Force: Password Guessing	Credential-access	T1110.001
Mon, Jun 12, 2023 @ 10:21:05 AM CDT	Brute Force: Password Guessing	Credential-access	T1110.001
Mon, Jun 12, 2023 @ 10:21:05 AM CDT	Brute Force: Password Guessing	Credential-access	T1110.001
Mon, Jun 12, 2023 @ 10:21:05 AM CDT	Adversary-in-the-Middle: LLMNR/NBT-NS Poisoning and SMB Relay	Credential-access	T1557.001
Mon, Jun 12, 2023 @ 10:21:05 AM CDT	Brute Force: Password Cracking	Credential-access	T1110.002

Internal Network PenTest

Engagement Scope of Work

Through discussions with Demo Client's staff, the following target applications, IP addresses, and/or ranges were included as part of the engagement scope.

IP ADDRESSES & RANGES			
10.10.0.0/24	10.10.1.0/24	10.10.3.0/24	10.10.4.0/24
10.10.5.0/24	10.10.6.0/24	10.0.7.0/24	10.10.9.0/24
10.10.10.0/24	10.10.12.0/24	10.20.0.0/23	10.30.0.0/23
10.40.0.0/23	10.99.0.0/24	10.0.254.0/24	

Agent Information

To perform this assessment, TRU Solutions used an agent consisting of the necessary tools to conduct discovery, enumeration, attacks, etc. The agent used in this assessment contained the following information:

DESCRIPTION	DETAILS
Agent Name	Dummy Agent for TRU PenTest-ScheduledTask
Private IP Address	10.10.1.4
Subnet Mask	255.255.0.0 (/16)
DNS Server	127.0.0.53
Default Gateway	10.10.0.1

Task Performed

To assess the targets listed above fully, TRU Solutions performed the following tasks:

TASK PERFORMED	DEVICES/LOCATIONS ASSESSED
Performed information gathering: NSlookup, and Ping/SNMP sweeping	All targets
Performed port scans	All active targets identified
Performed vulnerability scanning	All active targets identified
Performed web application vulnerability testing	Active/Select targets
Performed vulnerability validation	All active targets identified
Performed penetration testing	Active/Select targets

Rules of Engagement

TRU Solutions and PenTest Demo Client agreed to the following rules of engagements:

ACTIVITY	DEFINITION	PERMISSION
Exploitation	TRU Solutions consultants will cautiously execute exploitation techniques to gain access to sensitive data and/or systems.	Permitted
Post Exploitation	If exploitation is successful, TRU Solutions will attempt to escalate privileges within the environment to gain further access to systems and/or data.	Permitted

Penetration Test Narrative

This phase of the internal network penetration test describes some of the action performed as part of the penetration test, including host discovery, enumeration, exploitation, and post-exploitation (if opportunities were identified). It should be noted that this portion of the report does not represent the entire list of activities that were performed as part of this assessment, primarily just those that led to some level of access, significant exposure to information, and other activities relevant to the goal of the assessment. It should also be noted that this portion of the test heavily focused on the network layer within the environment.

Host Discovery

The first process that was performed during the penetration test was host discovery. Host discovery includes several tasks, including port scanning and ping sweeps, to identify the active systems within the environment. This is a crucial step in the penetration test as it allows attackers to determine what systems are active within the targeted IP addresses and/or ranges.

Of the fifteen (15) IP addresses/ranges that were provided as part of the scope, TRU Solutions was able to identify a total of two hundred and seventy-six (276) systems to be active within the targeted environment.

MITRE ATT&CK®	
Name	Active Scanning: Scanning IP Blocks
Tactic	Reconnaissance
TTP ID	T1595.001
Note	TRU Solutions also performed a port scan against two hundred and seventy-six (276) targets to identify opened ports and running services. Port scanning is also important in that it allows one to identify which ports are opened and visible from the tested system. By discovering opened ports within the environment, it is then possible to determine which services are running and if any of the running services are vulnerable.

Of the two hundred and seventy-six (276) addresses/ranges that were scanned, TRU Solutions found one thousand and seventeen (1,017) ports opened.

Enumeration

After identifying the available hosts within the network, the next phase is to conduct enumeration. Enumeration consists of scanning the identified ports to determine what services are running. Additional scans are performed based on the running services to attempt enumerating information from the running services (if possible). Such information may be useful for identifying additional vulnerabilities or knowledge for performing an attack against the service.

To help understand the operating systems and ports that were found to be most common within the environment, the following tables display the top 10 operating systems and top 10 ports.

OPERATING SYSTEM	COUNT
Undetected	238
Windows 10.0 Build 19041 x64	16
Windows 10.0 Build 18362 x64	12
Windows 10.0 Build 17763 x64	3
Windows Server 2016 Standard 14393 x64	2
Windows 7 Professional 7601 Service Pack 1 x64	1
Unix	1
Windows Server 2012 R2 Standard 9600 x64	1
VxWorks	1

Windows 5.1	1
PORT/PROTOCOL	COUNT
80/tcp	218
22/tcp	104
23/tcp	89
443/tcp	69
5060/tcp	46
445/tcp	41
135/tcp	39
9100/tcp	37
631/tcp	37
515/tcp	37

The first step in the enumeration phase was the discovery of systems on the local subnet.

MITRE ATT&CK®	
Name	Remote System Discovery
Tactic	Discovery
TTP ID	T1018
Note	TRU PenTest Demo Partner performed an arp-scan across the local network subnet to determine which systems are on the local subnet (10.10.1.4/16). This is also an essential task as these systems would be targets for man-in-the-middle attacks since they are on the same subnet. To facilitate this task, TRU PenTest Demo Partner used a tool known as <i>arp-scan</i> .

The following results demonstrate that two hundred and ninety-one (291) systems exist on the same local subnet:

```
Interface: eth0, type: EN10MB, MAC: e4:5f:01:00:c3:54, IPv4: 10.10.1.4
Starting arp-scan 1.10.0 with 65536 hosts (https://github.com/royhills/arp-scan)
10.10.0.1      40:a8:f0:dd:68:00      Hewlett Packard
10.10.0.2      a0:b3:cc:1b:06:00      Hewlett Packard
10.10.0.3      40:a8:f0:e0:06:00      Hewlett Packard
10.10.0.20     10:1f:74:a2:af:20      Hewlett Packard
10.10.0.24     3c:2a:f4:b8:66:01      Brother Industries, LTD.
10.10.0.34     ec:9a:74:b7:ff:c0      Hewlett Packard
10.10.0.40     e8:39:35:7f:fa:20      Hewlett Packard
10.10.0.45     40:a8:f0:d8:89:00      Hewlett Packard
10.10.0.46     f0:92:1c:3c:80:00      Hewlett Packard
10.10.0.50     d4:c9:ef:c3:41:80      Hewlett Packard
10.10.0.51     d4:c9:ef:c3:11:40      Hewlett Packard
10.10.0.52     10:1f:74:a2:ef:e0      Hewlett Packard
10.10.0.54     74:46:a0:08:b8:a0      Hewlett Packard
10.10.0.55     1c:98:ec:8f:d7:80      Hewlett Packard Enterprise
10.10.0.57     ec:eb:b8:78:ad:c0      Hewlett Packard Enterprise
10.10.0.58     3c:4a:92:a6:9f:00      Hewlett Packard
10.10.0.61     10:4f:58:64:0f:00      Aruba, a Hewlett Packard Enterprise Company
10.10.0.62     10:4f:58:68:a3:00      Aruba, a Hewlett Packard Enterprise Company
10.10.0.63     b8:d4:e7:8e:32:80      Aruba, a Hewlett Packard Enterprise Company

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The remainder of this output has been snipped for reporting purposes.
```

While TRU PenTest Demo Partner identified these systems via arp-scan on the local subnet, it was noted that these systems were in scope as part of this penetration test, but could potentially have exploits or vulnerabilities present. As a result, the systems

identified above are only shown for informational purposes.

TRU Solutions identified one (1) Microsoft SQL (MSSQL) Service present within the tested environment. While this discovery does not indicate any significant issues were found, MSSQL services are often targeted by attackers in a form of a password attack. A successful password attack will usually result in limited or elevated privileges to the SQL server, at which point an attacker can begin to run SQL commands or execute system level commands.

MITRE ATT&CK [®]	
Name	Brute Force: Password Guessing
Tactic	Credential-access
TTP ID	T1110.001
Note	TRU PenTest Demo Partner performed an enumeration to identify information about Microsoft SQL servers found within the discovery phase.

The following information was discovered from the Microsoft SQL servers:

TRU Solutions identified one (1) MySQL service present within the tested environment. While this discovery does not indicate any significant issues were found, MySQL services are often targeted by attackers in a form of a password attack. A successful password attack will usually result in limited or elevated privileges to the SQL service, at which point an attacker can begin to run SQL commands or execute system level commands.

MITRE ATT&CK [®]	
Name	Network Service Discovery
Tactic	Discovery
TTP ID	T1046
Note	TRU Solutions performed an enumeration to identify information about the MySQL services found during the discovery phase.

The following information was enumerated from the MySQL service(s) found during this assessment:

```
[*] 10.10.1.225:3306 - 10.10.1.225:3306 is running MySQL, but responds with an error: \x04Host '10.10.1.4' is not allowed to connect to this MySQL server
```

Next, TRU Solutions identified thirteen (13) systems that exposed port 3389/tcp, which hosts the Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) service and began enumerating information from the opened services. In particular, TRU Solutions attempted to identify whether or not the targets were vulnerable to common vulnerabilities that could be exploited to achieve remote code execution or denial-of-service (DoS).

Thirteen (13) systems were scanned using the cve_2019_0708_bluekeep module to identify potential RDP vulnerabilities. Scan results identified one (1) vulnerable system. The following results were obtained from this scan:

```
[*] file:/root/pentest/102172/discovery/port_scans/open_ports/tcp/3389.txt:3389 - Scanned 9 of 13 hosts (69% complete)
[+] 10.10.9.164:3389 - The target is vulnerable. The target attempted cleanup of the incorrectly-bound MS_T120 channel.
[*] file:/root/pentest/102172/discovery/port_scans/open_ports/tcp/3389.txt:3389 - Scanned 10 of 13 hosts (76% complete)
[*] file:/root/pentest/102172/discovery/port_scans/open_ports/tcp/3389.txt:3389 - Scanned 10 of 13 hosts (76% complete)
[*] file:/root/pentest/102172/discovery/port_scans/open_ports/tcp/3389.txt:3389 - Scanned 10 of 13 hosts (76% complete)
[*] file:/root/pentest/102172/discovery/port_scans/open_ports/tcp/3389.txt:3389 - Scanned 10 of 13 hosts (76% complete)
[*] file:/root/pentest/102172/discovery/port_scans/open_ports/tcp/3389.txt:3389 - Scanned 11 of 13 hosts (84% complete)
[*] file:/root/pentest/102172/discovery/port_scans/open_ports/tcp/3389.txt:3389 - Scanned 12 of 13 hosts (92% complete)
[*] file:/root/pentest/102172/discovery/port_scans/open_ports/tcp/3389.txt:3389 - Scanned 12 of 13 hosts (92% complete)
```

```
[*] file:/root/pentest/102172/discovery/port_scans/open_ports/tcp/3389.txt:3389 - Scanned 12 of 13 hosts (92% complete)
[*] file:/root/pentest/102172/discovery/port_scans/open_ports/tcp/3389.txt:3389 - Scanned 13 of 13 hosts (100% complete)
```

TRU Solutions identified one (1) PostgreSQL service present within the tested environment. While this discovery does not indicate any significant issues were found, PostgreSQL services are often targeted by attackers in a form of a password attack. A successful password attack will usually result in limited or elevated privileges to the SQL service, at which point an attacker can begin to run SQL commands or execute system level commands.

MITRE | ATT&CK®

Name	Network Service Discovery
Tactic	Discovery
TTP ID	T1046
Note	TRU Solutions performed an enumeration to identify information about the PostgreSQL services found during the discovery phase.

The following information was enumerated from the PostgreSQL service(s) found during this assessment:

```
[*] 10.10.1.203:5432 Postgres - Version Unknown (Pre-Auth)
```

Testing of FTP services identified ten (10) systems to accept anonymous FTP authentication credentials. Anonymous login credentials would allow an attacker to identify files that may exist on an FTP server. If permissions allow for write access, an attacker could also attempt to use this to store malicious code. The following output displays the results of this FTP scan:

```
Nmap scan report for 10.30.1.192
Host is up, received user-set (0.0037s latency).
Scanned at 2023-06-11 01:45:56 UTC for 0s

PORT      STATE SERVICE REASON
21/tcp    open  ftp      syn-ack ttl 63
| ftp-anon: Anonymous FTP login allowed (FTP code 230)
| total 1
| -r--r--r--  1 root    printer  4096 Sep 28  2001 CFG-PAGE.TXT
|_-----  1 root    printer    0 Sep 28  2001 Sleep-----
```

While analyzing one of the FTP services at 10.10.0.105, TRU Solutions was able to enumerate the directory structure. The results of the directory structure listing are below:

```
./
./help
./info
./prnlog
./stat
./syslog
```

MITRE | ATT&CK®

Name	Network Service Discovery
Tactic	Discovery
TTP ID	T1046
Note	TRU Solutions continued testing against these services by attempting to enumerate the files stored on the affected FTP servers. To facilitate this process, TRU Solutions leveraged the <i>lftp</i> tool, which can significantly expedite the time it takes to enumerate FTP services.

Based on the results of the reviewed FTP services, no sensitive information was identified.

TRU Solutions identified eighty-nine (89) Telnet services within the environment. As Telnet is an insecure protocol, it could potentially expose sensitive information such as user credentials or device configuration information in a man-in-the-middle attack. The following scan results display some information that was discovered as a result of these scans:

```
[+] 10.10.0.2:23      - 10.10.0.2:23 TELNET \x1b[2J\x1b[ -- snipped --
[+] 10.10.0.1:23      - 10.10.0.1:23 TELNET \x1b[2J\x1b[ -- snipped --
[+] 10.10.0.46:23     - 10.10.0.46:23 TELNET \x1b[2J\x1b[ -- snipped --
[+] 10.10.0.50:23     - 10.10.0.50:23 TELNET \x1b[2J\x1b[ -- snipped --
[+] 10.99.0.1:23      - 10.99.0.1:23 TELNET \x1b[2J\x1b[ -- snipped --
[+] 10.99.0.2:23      - 10.99.0.2:23 TELNET \x1b[2J\x1b[ -- snipped --
[+] 10.10.0.58:23     - 10.10.0.58:23 TELNET Sorry, the -- snipped --
[+] 10.10.0.51:23     - 10.10.0.51:23 TELNET Sorry, the -- snipped --
[+] 10.10.0.3:23      - 10.10.0.3:23 TELNET Sorry, the m -- snipped --
[+] 10.10.0.54:23     - 10.10.0.54:23 TELNET \x1b[2J\x1b[ -- snipped --
[+] 10.10.0.45:23     - 10.10.0.45:23 TELNET \x1b[2J\x1b[ -- snipped --
[+] 10.10.0.57:23     - 10.10.0.57:23 TELNET \x1b[2J\x1b[ -- snipped --
[+] 10.10.0.34:23     - 10.10.0.34:23 TELNET \x1b[2J\x1b[ -- snipped --
[+] 10.99.0.50:23     - 10.99.0.50:23 TELNET \x1b[2J\x1b[ -- snipped --
[+] 10.99.0.46:23     - 10.99.0.46:23 TELNET \x1b[2J\x1b[ -- snipped --
[+] 10.40.0.62:23     - 10.40.0.62:23 TELNET Sorry, the -- snipped --
[+] 10.40.0.63:23     - 10.40.0.63:23 TELNET Sorry, the -- snipped --
[+] 10.99.0.3:23      - 10.99.0.3:23 TELNET Sorry, the m -- snipped --
[+] 10.99.0.45:23     - 10.99.0.45:23 TELNET \x1b[2J\x1b[ -- snipped --
[+] 10.99.0.34:23     - 10.99.0.34:23 TELNET \x1b[2J\x1b[ -- snipped --
[+] 10.99.0.54:23     - 10.99.0.54:23 TELNET \x1b[2J\x1b[ -- snipped --

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The remainder of this output has been snipped for reporting purposes.
```

Next, TRU Solutions identified forty-one (41) systems that exposed port 445/tcp, which is for the Server Message Block (SMB) service. This service was targeted for the enumeration of information that may be valuable. One of the first things scanned during this process is the support for SMB signing. SMB signing, when enabled, helps mitigate SMB relay attacks. SMB relay attacks are when an attacker performs a poisoning attack and tricks a vulnerable system into sending hashed authentication credentials to the attacker. The attacker then takes these hashed credentials and *relays* them to another system, pivoting off that authenticated session to perform additional attacks, such as remote command execution.

Testing identified four (4) of the forty-one (41) systems with port 445/tcp opened that did not require SMB signing, therefore being vulnerable to SMB relay attacks. The following sample output from CrackMapExec identified this weakness:

```
10.10.9.164:(signing:False)
10.10.1.206:(signing:False)
10.10.0.220:(signing:False)
10.10.1.150:(signing:False)
```

MITRE ATT&CK®	
Name	System Information Discovery
Tactic	Discovery
TTP ID	T1082
Note	Additionally, scans were conducted across these systems to identify information about the operating systems, including operating system versions, service pack versions, domain membership, etc.

As part of this operating system identification process, TRU Solutions identified thirty-eight (38) operating systems. It's important to note that the tools and techniques used to gather information about operating system versions are not always 100% accurate. While TRU Solutions makes several attempts to confirm the accurate operating systems through additional

methods, it should be noted that some results may require additional validation from a system administrator. The following output demonstrates some of the results obtained:

SMB	10.10.4.203	445	[obfuscated-dns]	[*]	Windows 10.0 Build 19041 x64 (name: [obfuscated-dns]) (domain:[obfuscated-domain].local) (signing:True) (SMBv1:False)
SMB	10.10.1.203	445	[obfuscated-dns]	[*]	Windows Server 2016 Standard 14393 x64 (name: [obfuscated-dns]) (domain:[obfuscated-domain].local) (signing:True) (SMBv1:True)
SMB	10.10.4.118	445	[obfuscated-dns]	[*]	Windows 10.0 Build 18362 x64 (name: [obfuscated-dns]) (domain:[obfuscated-domain].local) (signing:True) (SMBv1:False)
SMB	10.10.5.123	445	[obfuscated-dns]	[*]	Windows 10.0 Build 18362 x64 (name: [obfuscated-dns]) (domain:[obfuscated-domain].local) (signing:True) (SMBv1:False)
SMB	10.10.5.164	445	[obfuscated-dns]	[*]	Windows 10.0 Build 19041 x64 (name: [obfuscated-dns]) (domain:[obfuscated-domain].local) (signing:True) (SMBv1:False)
SMB	10.10.4.165	445	[obfuscated-dns]	[*]	Windows 10.0 Build 19041 x64 (name: [obfuscated-dns]) (domain:[obfuscated-domain].local) (signing:True) (SMBv1:False)
SMB	10.10.3.78	445	[obfuscated-dns]	[*]	Windows 10.0 Build 19041 x64 (name: [obfuscated-dns]) (domain:[obfuscated-domain].local) (signing:True) (SMBv1:False)
SMB	10.10.3.196	445	[obfuscated-dns]	[*]	Windows 10.0 Build 19041 x64 (name: [obfuscated-dns]) (domain:[obfuscated-domain].local) (signing:True) (SMBv1:False)
SMB	10.10.6.8	445	[obfuscated-dns]	[*]	Windows 10.0 Build 18362 x64 (name: [obfuscated-dns]) (domain:[obfuscated-domain].local) (signing:True) (SMBv1:False)
SMB	10.10.0.140	445	[obfuscated-dns]	[*]	Windows Server 2012 R2 Standard 9600 x64 (name: [obfuscated-dns]) (domain:[obfuscated-domain].local) (signing:True) (SMBv1:True)
SMB	10.10.4.147	445	[obfuscated-dns]	[*]	Windows 10.0 Build 19041 x64 (name: [obfuscated-dns]) (domain:[obfuscated-domain].local) (signing:True) (SMBv1:False)
SMB	10.10.1.150	445	[obfuscated-dns]	[*]	Unix (name: [obfuscated-dns]) (domain:%H) (SMBv1:True)
SMB	10.10.0.220	445	[obfuscated-dns]	[*]	Windows 10.0 Build 17763 x64 (name: [obfuscated-dns]) (domain:[obfuscated-domain]) (SMBv1:False)
SMB	10.10.6.121	445	[obfuscated-dns]	[*]	Windows 10.0 Build 18362 x64 (name: [obfuscated-dns]) (domain:[obfuscated-domain].local) (signing:True) (SMBv1:False)
SMB	10.10.4.24	445	[obfuscated-dns]	[*]	Windows 10.0 Build 19041 x64 (name: [obfuscated-dns]) (domain:[obfuscated-domain].local) (signing:True) (SMBv1:False)
SMB	10.10.1.206	445	[obfuscated-dns]	[*]	VxWorks (name:) (domain:) (SMBv1:True)
SMB	10.10.6.58	445	[obfuscated-dns]	[*]	Windows 10.0 Build 18362 x64 (name: [obfuscated-dns]) (domain:[obfuscated-domain].local) (signing:True) (SMBv1:False)
SMB	10.10.1.207	445	[obfuscated-dns]	[*]	Windows 10.0 Build 17763 x64 (name: [obfuscated-dns]) (domain:[obfuscated-domain].local) (signing:True) (SMBv1:False)
SMB	10.10.5.43	445	[obfuscated-dns]	[*]	Windows 10.0 Build 18362 x64 (name: [obfuscated-dns]) (domain:[obfuscated-domain].local) (signing:True) (SMBv1:False)
SMB	10.10.3.95	445	[obfuscated-dns]	[*]	Windows 10.0 Build 18362 x64 (name: [obfuscated-dns]) (domain:[obfuscated-domain].local) (signing:True) (SMBv1:False)
SMB	10.10.3.121	445	[obfuscated-dns]	[*]	Windows 10.0 Build 19041 x64 (name: [obfuscated-dns]) (domain:[obfuscated-domain].local) (signing:True) (SMBv1:False)
----- SNIPPED -----					
The remainder of this output has been snipped for reporting purposes.					

TRU Solutions also identified one (1) system that used an outdated operating system. Outdated operating systems are no longer supported by their vendor and could pose a significant threat to the environment due to their lack of security updates. The following output demonstrates an example of the outdated operating systems discovered:

SMB	10.10.3.24	445	[obfuscated-dns]	[*]	Windows 7 Professional 7601 Service Pack 1 x64 (name:[obfuscated-dns]) (domain:[obfuscated-domain]) (signing:True) (SMBv1:True)
-----	------------	-----	------------------	-----	---

MITRE ATT&CK®	
Name	Gather Victim Host Information: Software
Tactic	Reconnaissance
TTP ID	T1592.002
Note	Next, in an attempt to identify some common security vulnerabilities in outdated operating systems, TRU Solutions leveraged the Metasploit Framework to perform specific checks to determine whether or not the

targeted system(s) were vulnerable. These vulnerabilities are often labeled as low-hanging fruit as they can easily provide full access to the compromised system if an exploit is successful.

Thirty-five (35) systems were scanned using the auxiliary/scanner/smb/smb_ms17_010 module to identify potential SMB vulnerabilities. This module attempts to discover systems that contain a common vulnerability named EternalBlue. When successfully exploited, this vulnerability could allow an attacker with system-level privileges on the system, allowing them to perform several post-exploitation techniques. Such post-exploitation techniques include the enumeration of local administrator password hashes, the enumeration of Active Directory infrastructure data, and more. Scans indicate that no systems were found to be vulnerable at the time of testing. The following results were obtained from this scan:

```
[~] 10.10.1.207:445 - An SMB Login Error occurred while connecting to the IPC$ tree.
[~] 10.10.3.204:445 - An SMB Login Error occurred while connecting to the IPC$ tree.
[~] 10.10.0.231:445 - An SMB Login Error occurred while connecting to the IPC$ tree.
[~] 10.10.3.95:445 - An SMB Login Error occurred while connecting to the IPC$ tree.
[~] 10.10.3.142:445 - An SMB Login Error occurred while connecting to the IPC$ tree.
[~] 10.10.5.164:445 - An SMB Login Error occurred while connecting to the IPC$ tree.
[~] 10.10.3.121:445 - An SMB Login Error occurred while connecting to the IPC$ tree.
[~] 10.10.4.9:445 - An SMB Login Error occurred while connecting to the IPC$ tree.
[~] 10.10.3.196:445 - An SMB Login Error occurred while connecting to the IPC$ tree.
[~] 10.10.3.24:445 - Host does NOT appear vulnerable.
[~] 10.10.3.251:445 - An SMB Login Error occurred while connecting to the IPC$ tree.
[~] 10.10.4.203:445 - An SMB Login Error occurred while connecting to the IPC$ tree.
[~] 10.10.4.24:445 - An SMB Login Error occurred while connecting to the IPC$ tree.
[~] 10.10.4.165:445 - An SMB Login Error occurred while connecting to the IPC$ tree.
[~] 10.10.4.147:445 - An SMB Login Error occurred while connecting to the IPC$ tree.
[~] 10.10.0.220:445 - An SMB Login Error occurred while connecting to the IPC$ tree.
[~] 10.10.4.196:445 - An SMB Login Error occurred while connecting to the IPC$ tree.
[~] 10.10.4.90:445 - An SMB Login Error occurred while connecting to the IPC$ tree.
[~] 10.10.3.230:445 - An SMB Login Error occurred while connecting to the IPC$ tree.
[~] 10.10.5.116:445 - An SMB Login Error occurred while connecting to the IPC$ tree.
[~] 10.10.3.209:445 - An SMB Login Error occurred while connecting to the IPC$ tree.
```

----- SNIPPED -----

The remainder of this output has been snipped for reporting purposes.

TRU Solutions then ran a custom script to check if any systems allowed for SMB NULL session authentication (i.e. without a username or password). SMB NULL sessions can allow attackers with network access to identify and possibly retrieve files that may exist on an SMB (445/tcp) server. If permissions allow for write access, an attacker could also attempt to use this to store malicious code. The results showed that one (1) system accepted SMB NULL session authentication:

10.10.1.206

The below sample evidence shows some of the results of this attack:

```
[10.10.1.206]
Anonymous login successful

  Sharename      Type      Comment
  -----
  IPC$           IPC
  MEMORY_CARD    Disk      FLASH MEMORY PHOTO
Reconnecting with SMB1 for workgroup listing.
Anonymous login successful

  Server      Comment
  -----
  Workgroup    Master
```

TRU Solutions then tried to take advantage of SMB NULL session authentication in order to enumerate the SMB shares available on the affected system. The aim of this process was to identify any accessible shares containing potentially sensitive company data as well as shares configured with WRITE access. However, no accessible shares were identified.

Additionally, an enumeration of SMB services was performed in an attempt to identify whether usernames, password policies, or additional computer and/or domain information could be obtained. Such information could be useful for performing a password attack against the environment. A sample output of one of the results is as follows:

```
Starting enum4linux v0.9.1 ( http://labs.portcullis.co.uk/application/enum4linux/ ) on Sun Jun 11 01:50:46 2023

===== ( Target Information ) =====

Target ..... 10.10.0.140
RID Range ..... 500-550,1000-1050
Username ..... ''
Password ..... ''
Known Usernames .. administrator, guest, krbtgt, domain admins, root, bin, none

===== ( Enumerating Workgroup/Domain on 10.10.0.140 ) =====

[E] Can't find workgroup/domain

===== ( Nbtstat Information for 10.10.0.140 ) =====

Looking up status of 10.10.0.140

----- SNIPPED -----

The remainder of this output has been snipped for reporting purposes.
```

No valuable information, such as domain/local user accounts and password policies, was obtained as part of this enumeration process.

Next, TRU Solutions's objective was to perform a password attack against the Active Directory environment. However, TRU Solutions needed to gather a list of potential domain user accounts to perform this process. TRU Solutions used the Kerbrute tool to assist with this process. Kerbrute is a tool that can be used to enumerate domain user accounts by interacting with Kerberos. Based on the response from a ticket-granting ticket (TGT) request to the key distribution center (KDC) server, Kerbrute is able to deduce whether or not the domain user account provided was valid or not.

TRU Solutions used naming schemes for four different naming conventions: 1) first initial last name, 2) first name last initial, 3) first name dot last initial (e.g. First.Last), and 4) first name. A combination of common first and last names was used as part of this process, as well as publicly available resources.

The following domain was observed as part of the initial host discovery scans performed at the beginning of the assessment:

→ [obfuscated-domain].local

MITRE ATT&CK®	
Name	System Owner/User Discovery
Tactic	Discovery
TTP ID	T1033
Note	TRU Solutions targeted the following domain controller(s) as part of this Kerberos user enumeration attack: 10.10.1.202 ([obfuscated-dns])

During this process, TRU Solutions discovered fifty-nine (59) valid domain user accounts for one (1) domain. The following usernames were observed:

[illegible]

During the enumeration phase of the test, TRU Solutions identified a total of fifty-nine (59) usernames using multiple tools, such as kerbrute and enum4linux, to target for a password attack.

During this password attack, TRU Solutions identified zero (0) successful login attempts and fifty-nine (59) failed login attempts. The complete evidence of this login attack can be found within the supporting evidence. The following is a short snippet of the password attack results:

[illegible]

The remainder of this output has been snipped for reporting purposes.

During testing, TRU Solutions identified one (1) system that was vulnerable to the RCE exploit called Bluekeep (CVE-2019-0708). However, the identified operating system for one (1) host is likely to crash during exploitation. Because of this, TRU Solutions did not attempt exploitation of this system.

MITRE | ATT&CK®

Name	Brute Force: Password Guessing
Tactic	Credential-access
TTP ID	T1110.001
Note	TRU Solutions also reviewed a list of one (1) Microsoft SQL (MSSQL) server and conducted a limited password attack to determine if any weak or default credentials could be discovered.

Weak credentials configured for an MSSQL server could result in significant issues, including remote command execution. No servers were found to contain weak or default credentials at the time of testing. The following code snippet shows sample output results of this scan:

```
[~] 10.10.3.24:1433      - 10.10.3.24:1433 - LOGIN FAILED: WORKSTATION\sapassword (Incorrect: )
[~] 10.10.3.24:1433      - 10.10.3.24:1433 - LOGIN FAILED: WORKSTATION\sasa (Incorrect: )
[~] 10.10.3.24:1433      - 10.10.3.24:1433 - LOGIN FAILED: WORKSTATION\sas: (Incorrect: )
```

MITRE | ATT&CK®

Name	Brute Force: Password Guessing
Tactic	Credential-access
TTP ID	T1110.001
Note	TRU Solutions also reviewed a list of one (1) MySQL server and conducted a limited password attack to determine if any weak or default credentials could be discovered.

Weak credentials configured for a MySQL server could result in significant issues, including remote command execution. No servers were found to contain weak or default credentials at the time of testing. The following code snippet shows sample output results of this scan:

```
[~] 10.10.1.225:3306      - 10.10.1.225:3306 - Unsupported target version of MySQL detected. Skipping.
```

MITRE | ATT&CK®

Name	Adversary-in-the-Middle: LLMNR/NBT-NS Poisoning and SMB Relay
Tactic	Credential-access
TTP ID	T1557.001
Note	As part of the exploitation phase, TRU Solutions continued to perform DNS poisoning attacks via NBNS, LLMNR and mDNS.

When enabled on Microsoft Windows systems, DNS names that cannot be resolved by a system's configured DNS server or local hosts file will be communicated in the form of NBNS and/or LLMNR broadcast packets across the network environment. Similarly, multicast DNS (mDNS) can be used within small networks to resolve a DNS name when no local DNS server exists. This is done via IP multicast query messages to the hosts on the local subnet. The problem with this configuration is that it is possible to

respond to these broadcast/multicast packets and spoof the IP address of the DNS name in question. In other words, if SystemA is attempting to resolve www.helloworld.com and cannot find its IP address, an attacking system can pretend to be the IP address of www.helloworld.com. Upon a successful attack, it may be possible to capture cleartext or hashed credentials.

TRU Solutions also deployed a rogue IPv6 router within the environment to determine if it'd be possible to conduct IPv6 attacks. Since IPv6 is treated with higher priority than IPv4, any time a network device sees an IPv6 router available, it will attempt to retrieve an IPv6 address. An attacker can abuse this by deploying a rogue DHCPv6 server within the environment and assigning all IPv6 clients with an IP address and DNS configurations that route traffic through the attacker's system.

While TRU Solutions was successful with capturing NBNS/LLMNR/mDNS broadcast packets across the local subnet, it was not possible to capture any credentials at the time of testing. This is primarily due to the lack of systems and/or services successfully authenticating to the penetration testing VM during these attacks. An example of these successful NBNS/LLMNR/mDNS poisoning attempts is shown below:

```
2023-06-11 02:10:27,806 - [*] [LLMNR] Poisoned answer sent to fe80::2187:14 for name [obfuscated-dns]
2023-06-11 02:10:27,808 - [*] [LLMNR] Poisoned answer sent to 10.10.8.5 for name [obfuscated-dns]
2023-06-11 02:10:28,256 - [*] [LLMNR] Poisoned answer sent to fe80::2187:14 for name [obfuscated-dns]
2023-06-11 02:10:28,263 - [*] [LLMNR] Poisoned answer sent to 10.10.8.5 for name [obfuscated-dns]
2023-06-11 02:10:28,298 - [*] [LLMNR] Poisoned answer sent to fe80::2187:14 for name [obfuscated-dns]
2023-06-11 02:10:28,304 - [*] [LLMNR] Poisoned answer sent to 10.10.8.5 for name [obfuscated-dns]
2023-06-11 02:11:27,338 - [*] [LLMNR] Poisoned answer sent to fe80::2187:14 for name wpad
2023-06-11 02:11:27,341 - [*] [LLMNR] Poisoned answer sent to 10.10.8.5 for name wpad
2023-06-11 02:11:27,345 - [*] [LLMNR] Poisoned answer sent to fe80::2187:14 for name wpad
2023-06-11 02:11:39,445 - [*] [LLMNR] Poisoned answer sent to fe80::2187:14 for name wpad
2023-06-11 02:11:39,446 - [*] [LLMNR] Poisoned answer sent to 10.10.8.5 for name wpad
2023-06-11 02:11:39,448 - [*] [LLMNR] Poisoned answer sent to fe80::2187:14 for name wpad
2023-06-11 02:11:43,594 - [*] [NBT-NS] Poisoned answer sent to 10.10.1.47 for name WORKGROUP (service: Local Master Browser)
2023-06-11 02:11:57,738 - [*] [NBT-NS] Poisoned answer sent to 10.10.1.150 for name [obfuscated-dns] (service: Local Master Browser)
2023-06-11 02:21:36,735 - [*] [LLMNR] Poisoned answer sent to fe80::b111:2fcc:8d38:3faa for name wpad
2023-06-11 02:21:36,739 - [*] [LLMNR] Poisoned answer sent to 10.10.8.5 for name wpad
2023-06-11 02:21:36,739 - [*] [LLMNR] Poisoned answer sent to fe80::b111:2fcc:8d38:3faa for name wpad
2023-06-11 02:22:05,567 - [*] [LLMNR] Poisoned answer sent to fe80::b111:2fcc:8d38:3faa for name [obfuscated-dns]
2023-06-11 02:22:05,568 - [*] [LLMNR] Poisoned answer sent to 10.10.8.5 for name [obfuscated-dns]
2023-06-11 02:22:06,553 - [*] [NBT-NS] Poisoned answer sent to 10.10.1.150 for name [obfuscated-dns] (service: Local Master Browser)
2023-06-11 02:22:06,555 - [*] [NBT-NS] Poisoned answer sent to 10.10.1.47 for name WORKGROUP (service: Local Master Browser)
```

----- SNIPPED -----

The remainder of this output has been snipped for reporting purposes.

When attempting to perform IPv6 attacks, TRU Solutions successfully assigned IPv6 addresses with the attacking system set as the default DNS server. An example of this can be found below:

```
Starting mitm6 using the following configuration:
Primary adapter: eth0 [e4:5f:01:00:c3:54]
IPv4 address: 10.10.1.4
IPv6 address: fe80::e65f:1ff:fe00:c354
Warning: Not filtering on any domain, mitm6 will reply to all DNS queries.
Unless this is what you want, specify at least one domain with -d
IPv6 address fe80::2187:1 is now assigned to mac=00:07:32:7b:32:65 host= ipv4=
IPv6 address fe80::2187:2 is now assigned to mac=f0:2a:2b:51:fb:3e host=[obfuscated-dns]. ipv4=
IPv6 address fe80::2187:3 is now assigned to mac=48:b0:2d:10:89:f0 host=[obfuscated-dns]. ipv4=
IPv6 address fe80::2187:4 is now assigned to mac=78:e7:d1:a1:ee:1d host= ipv4=
IPv6 address fe80::2187:6 is now assigned to mac=bc:4a:56:02:16:31 host=router4478AE. ipv4=
IPv6 address fe80::2187:7 is now assigned to mac=00:07:32:7b:32:65 host= ipv4=
IPv6 address fe80::2187:8 is now assigned to mac=00:1e:67:59:ed:a5 host=[obfuscated-dns].[obfuscated-domain].local. ipv4=
Sent spoofed reply for wpad.[obfuscated-domain].local. to fe80::2187:8
IPv6 address fe80::2187:10 is now assigned to mac=00:9c:02:c1:27:2f host=[obfuscated-dns]. ipv4=
Sent spoofed reply for ctldl.windowsupdate.com. to fe80::be4a:56ff:fe02:1631
Sent spoofed reply for ctldl.windowsupdate.com. to fe80::be4a:56ff:fe02:1631
IPv6 address fe80::2187:11 is now assigned to mac=38:ca:84:ce:84:43 host=[obfuscated-dns]had. ipv4=
IPv6 address fe80::2187:12 is now assigned to mac=00:25:90:65:ad:d4 host=[obfuscated-dns].[obfuscated-domain].local. ipv4=
```

IPv6 address fe80::2187:14 is now assigned to mac=00:25:90:69:e2:de host=[obfuscated-dns].[obfuscated-domain].local. ipv4= Sent spoofed reply for isatap.[obfuscated-domain].local. to fe80::2187:14

----- SNIPPED -----

The remainder of this output has been snipped for reporting purposes.

At the time of testing, TRU Solutions was successful with capturing password hashes via NTLM relaying attacks. The following output is a snippet of the NTLM relay log results:

Impacket v0.10.0 - Copyright 2022 SecureAuth Corporation

```
[*] HTTPD(80): Client requested path: /msdownload/update/v3/static/trustedr/en/authrootstl.cab?0f2e7c3ffb5c870b
[*] HTTPD(80): Client requested path: /msdownload/update/v3/static/trustedr/en/authrootstl.cab?359566c305181112
[*] HTTPD(80): Client requested path: /msdownload/update/v3/static/trustedr/en/authrootstl.cab?7beacdcb3866ca0
[*] HTTPD(80): Client requested path: /msdownload/update/v3/static/trustedr/en/authrootstl.cab?f1b044029ccc57f5
[*] HTTPD(80): Client requested path: /wpad.dat
[*] HTTPD(80): Client requested path: /wpad.dat
[*] HTTPD(80): Client requested path: /msdownload/update/v3/static/trustedr/en/authrootstl.cab?123951b7d891ea05
[*] HTTPD(80): Client requested path: /msdownload/update/v3/static/trustedr/en/authrootstl.cab?3842b29457a5042b
[*] HTTPD(80): Client requested path: /msdownload/update/v3/static/trustedr/en/authrootstl.cab?0e863877f2bb2c72
[*] HTTPD(80): Client requested path: /msdownload/update/v3/static/trustedr/en/authrootstl.cab?bac14001ed8b8d1e
[*] HTTPD(80): Client requested path: /wpad.dat
[*] HTTPD(80): Client requested path: /wpad.dat
[*] HTTPD(80): Client requested path: /msdownload/update/v3/static/trustedr/en/authrootstl.cab?5dcd6cace05af320
[*] HTTPD(80): Client requested path: /msdownload/update/v3/static/trustedr/en/disallowedcertstl.cab?5499967f4a1ff7dd
[-] HTTPD(80): Exception in HTTP request handler: [Errno 104] Connection reset by peer
[-] HTTPD(80): Exception in HTTP request handler: [Errno 104] Connection reset by peer
[-] HTTPD(80): Exception in HTTP request handler: [Errno 104] Connection reset by peer
[-] HTTPD(80): Exception in HTTP request handler: [Errno 104] Connection reset by peer
```

----- SNIPPED -----

The remainder of this output has been snipped for reporting purposes.

While conducting DNS poisoning and NTLM Relay attacks, it was possible to obtain one (1) new password hash. These hashes were queued into a password recovery process in an attempt to identify the cleartext password. An example of up to five (5) captured hashes can be found below:

[obfuscated username]::[obfuscated-domain]:56c4e1b16ae0e5cb:7b3f70dea98fbd0a96d380e1213cd515:010100000000...[partially-obfuscated]

TRU Solutions attempted to obtain the plaintext password for the acquired hash by leveraging the HashCat password cracking tool and a list of common passwords to try. During this attack, one (1) plaintext password was uncovered:

[obfuscated-domain].local\[obfuscated username]:[obfuscated]

In order to verify the obtained plaintext domain account password, TRU Solutions used the credentials to try and authenticate to the domain controller at 10.10.1.203. The results of this attack showed that the password was valid:

SMB	10.10.1.203	445	[obfuscated-dns]	[+] [obfuscated-domain].local\[obfuscated username]:[obfuscated]
-----	-------------	-----	------------------	--

The captured Net-NTLM hashes were relayed to the targeted system(s). This attack resulted in the SAM database containing the hashed passwords for local users being dumped from one (1) host:

10.10.9.164_samhashes.sam

TRU Solutions used all previously obtained local account password hashes and domain account credentials to try and authenticate to all discovered hosts that had the SMB service (port 445/tcp) available. The aim of this attack, which leveraged the pass-the-hash technique, was to check if these credentials provided local Administrator privileges on any hosts. TRU Solutions

leveraged these credentials to successfully authenticate to thirty-six (36) hosts. Moreover, the credentials provided local administrator privileges on two (2) of those systems. See the breakdown of results below:

[COMPROMISED HOSTS]

```
- IP: 10.10.1.206      Privileges obtained: regular user
- IP: 10.10.3.78       Privileges obtained: regular user
- IP: 10.10.3.95       Privileges obtained: regular user
- IP: 10.10.3.120      Privileges obtained: regular user
- IP: 10.10.3.121      Privileges obtained: regular user
- IP: 10.10.3.142      Privileges obtained: regular user
- IP: 10.10.3.164      Privileges obtained: regular user
- IP: 10.10.3.196      Privileges obtained: regular user
- IP: 10.10.3.204      Privileges obtained: regular user
- IP: 10.10.3.209      Privileges obtained: regular user
- IP: 10.10.3.230      Privileges obtained: regular user
- IP: 10.10.3.251      Privileges obtained: regular user
- IP: 10.10.4.9        Privileges obtained: regular user
- IP: 10.10.4.24       Privileges obtained: regular user
- IP: 10.10.4.90       Privileges obtained: regular user
- IP: 10.10.4.118      Privileges obtained: regular user
- IP: 10.10.4.147      Privileges obtained: regular user
- IP: 10.10.4.165      Privileges obtained: regular user
- IP: 10.10.4.203      Privileges obtained: regular user
- IP: 10.10.4.253      Privileges obtained: regular user
```

--- snipped (showing 20 out of 29) ---

[SAMPLE EVIDENCE]

```
-----
SMB      10.10.9.164    445    [obfuscated-dns]    [+] [obfuscated-domain]\administrator:[partially-obfuscated]16022
(Pwn3d!)
SMB      10.10.9.164    445    [obfuscated-dns]    [+] [obfuscated-domain].local\[obfuscated username]:[obfuscated]
(Pwn3d!)
SMB      10.10.1.206    445    [obfuscated-dns]    [+] \[obfuscated username]:[partially-obfuscated]1720a
SMB      10.10.3.78     445    [obfuscated-dns]    [+] [obfuscated-dns]\admin:[partially-obfuscated]de875
-----
```

TRU Solutions then leveraged the credentials for the compromised account(s) to run the impacket-secretsdump tool against the two (2) systems where the compromised account(s) had local admin privileges. This attack aimed to obtain password hashes and/or plaintext passwords from the SAM database and from memory. The below sample evidence shows some of the credentials that were obtained during this attack:

PlainText (1)

```
---
[obfuscated-domain].local\[obfuscated username]:[obfuscated]
```

NTLM (7)

```
---
admin:1005:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:082dcc95a1292874ff[obfuscated]
administrator:500:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:aa1d5e70dd2[obfuscated]
[obfuscated username]:1007:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:f051feb0dd37[obfuscated]
---snipped---
```

NTLM Domain Computer (1)

```
---
[obfuscated-domain]\[obfuscated computer name]$:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:2bbe4435a267574[obfuscated]
```

MSCache (10)

```
---
[obfuscated username]:aac0b7405e9ec166[obfuscated]
[obfuscated username]:2c6325984ed579c662[obfuscated]
[obfuscated username]:32d1b7d75bd0c1f5c0a[obfuscated]
---snipped---
```

TRU Solutions attempted to obtain the plaintext password for the acquired hash(es) by leveraging the HashCat password cracking tool and a list of common passwords to try. However, this attack failed.

In order to verify the obtained plaintext domain account password, TRU Solutions used the credentials to try and authenticate to the domain controller at 10.10.1.203. The results of this attack showed that the password was valid and even provided TRU Solutions with local admin rights on the domain controller:

SMB d!)	10.10.1.203	445	BO-PDC2	[+] [obfuscated-domain].local\[obfuscated username]:[obfuscated] (Pwn3d!)
------------	-------------	-----	---------	---

Next, TRU Solutions used the CME tool together with the [obfuscated-domain].local\[obfuscated username] credentials in order to obtain the password policy for the [obfuscated-domain].local domain from the domain controller at 10.10.1.203:

```
Minimum password length: 8
Password history length: 6
Maximum password age: 355 days 3 minutes

Password Complexity Flags: 000001
  Domain Refuse Password Change: 0
  Domain Password Store Cleartext: 0
  Domain Password Lockout Admins: 0
  Domain Password No Clear Change: 0
  Domain Password No Anon Change: 0
  Domain Password Complex: 1

Minimum password age: 1 day 4 minutes
Reset Account Lockout Counter: 10 minutes
Locked Account Duration: 10 minutes
Account Lockout Threshold: 5
Forced Log off Time: Not Set
```

The results showed that the [obfuscated-domain].local domain was configured with the following weak password policy setting(s):

Reset Account Lockout Counter: 10
Locked Account Duration: 10

In order to obtain more information on the [obfuscated-domain].local domain, TRU Solutions used the password for the [obfuscated-domain].local\[obfuscated username] account to enumerate LDAP using the Bloodhound-Python tool. A total of four hundred and thirty-four (434) computers, three hundred and forty-six (346) users and one hundred and one (101) groups were identified on the domain in this manner. The results also showed that the domain was configured with fourteen (14) domain admin accounts. The below sample evidence shows some of the active directory information that was gathered:

```
[computers]
--snipped--
[obfuscated-dns]
[obfuscated-dns]
[obfuscated-dns]
[obfuscated-dns]
[obfuscated-dns]
--snipped--

[domain admins]
--snipped--
[obfuscated user account]
[obfuscated user account]
[obfuscated user account]
[obfuscated user account]
[obfuscated user account]
--snipped--

[groups]
--snipped--
password boss users
vpn
duo mfa
enterprise key admins
system managed accounts group
--snipped--
```

```
[users]
--snipped--
NT AUTHORITY
[obfuscated user account]
[obfuscated user account]
[obfuscated user account]
[obfuscated user account]
--snipped--
```

The active directory information that had previously been obtained via LDAP enumeration, showed that the [obfuscated-domain].local[obfuscated username] account was part of the domain admins group. This meant that TRU Solutions had now fully compromised the [obfuscated-domain].local domain.

Next, TRU Solutions attempted to perform an attack known as Kerberoasting. This attack takes advantage of the Kerberos protocol and can be performed for any valid domain user account, regardless of privileges. When an active directory user logs in, they receive a Ticket Granting Ticket (TGT) from the Kerberos key distribution center. If the authenticated user then requests a specific resource in the domain, their TGT is used to request a Ticket Granting Service (TGS) token for that resource. Part of this TGS is encrypted with the NTLM hash of the service account for the requested resource. If an attacker obtains a TGS, they can try and crack it and obtain the user's password via brute-force methods or lists of common passwords. Obtaining a TGS requires knowledge of the existing service principal names (SPNs) that Windows uses to identify which service accounts are being used to encrypt TGS tokens.

TRU Solutions used the credentials for the [obfuscated-domain].local[obfuscated username] account together with the impacket-GetUserSPNs tool in an attempt to obtain the SPNs configured on the domain and use those to obtain TGS tokens.

The below results show that two (2) unique SPNS were obtained:

ServicePrincipalName	Name	MemberOf
MSSQLSvc/[obfuscated-dns].[obfuscated-domain].local:SQLEXPRESS	Administrator	CN=SophosAdministrator,CN=Users,DC=[obfuscated-domain],DC=local
MSSQLSvc/[obfuscated-domain]School.[obfuscated-domain].local:SQLAVG	setup	CN=Administration,OU=Administrative,DC=[obfuscated-domain],DC=local

The SPNS were then used to retrieve two (2) unique TGS tokens:

```
$krb5tgs$23$*Administrator$[obfuscated-domain].local$[obfuscated-domain].local/Administrator*$[obfuscated]
$krb5tgs$23$*setup$[obfuscated-domain].local$[obfuscated-domain].local/setup*$[obfuscated]
```

TRU Solutions attempted to obtain the plaintext password for the acquired hashes by leveraging the HashCat password cracking tool and a list of common passwords to try. During this attack, one (1) plaintext password was uncovered:

```
[obfuscated-domain].local\setup:[obfuscated]
```

In order to verify the obtained plaintext domain account password, TRU Solutions used the credentials to try and authenticate to the domain controller at 10.10.1.203. The results of this attack showed that the password was valid and even provided TRU Solutions with local admin rights on the domain controller:

```
SMB      10.10.1.203      445      BO-PDC2      [+] [obfuscated-domain].local\setup:[obfuscated] (Pwn3d!)
```

Next, TRU Solutions used the obtained domain admin credentials in order to enumerate the SMB shares available on the compromised system(s). The aim of this process was to identify any accessible shares containing potentially sensitive company data. At the time of testing, sensitive data was discovered, including email information, tax information, financial information, credentials, passports. The below evidence shows some of the sensitive information that was observed:

```
[credentials]
\\10.10.1.203\administration\[obfuscated name]\Passwords\Amazon userid-password.doc      A      26112   Tue Jul  9 14:02:
50 2013
\\10.10.1.203\administration\[obfuscated name]\Passwords\Pitney Bowes userid-password.doc  A      22016   Mon Jul 22 16:3
```

```

1:35 2019
\\10.10.1.203\administration\[obfuscated name]\Passwords\School Speciality userid-password.doc      A    27136  Tue Jul 28
21:15:56 2020
\\10.10.1.203\administration\[obfuscated name]\Passwords\USPS userid-password.doc              A    27136  Wed Sep  2 17:29:
48 2020
\\10.10.1.203\administration\[obfuscated name]\Passwords\Amazon userid-password.doc          A    26112  Tue Jul  9 14:0
2:50 2013
--snipped--

[email information]
\\10.10.1.202\gdrive\Scans\Physical Forms\HS Girls\Samson, Amber 2021-4-28 email re-date.pdf    A    236174  Fri Jul 31 0
1:20:04 2020
\\10.10.1.202\gdrive\Scans\Physical Forms\HS Girls\EXPIRED 2019-20 Sports Physicals\Hentges, Kadence 2019-10-31 Email.pdf
A    125779  Thu Oct 31 22:15:26 2019
\\10.10.1.203\administration\[obfuscated name]\JOBS e-mail.doc                             A    24064  Mon Jan 28 19:40:24 2008
\\10.10.1.203\administration\[obfuscated name]\Board member Info\Email info for board members.docx      A    12578  Fri Fe
b  4 16:38:11 2022
\\10.10.1.203\administration\[obfuscated name]\Church Bulletins\Email addresses for church bulletins.docx      A    12268
Fri Jan 14 21:17:29 2022
--snipped--

[financial information]
\\10.10.1.203\administration\[obfuscated name]\Lodge of the Four Seasons - Credit Auth Form for Don Jeffries.pdf      A
84105  Fri Mar 23 21:30:00 2018
\\10.10.1.203\administration\[obfuscated name]\Paint the Town Paid Invoice.docx              A    68616  Fri Aug  3 15:40:29 2018
\\10.10.1.203\administration\[obfuscated name]\Credit Card - 2008-2009.xls                 A    16384  Fri Jun 26 18:24:44 2009
\\10.10.1.203\administration\[obfuscated name]\Credit Card - 2009-2010.xls                 A    52736  Thu Jul 15 22:08:04 2010
\\10.10.1.203\administration\[obfuscated name]\D & K Invoice Worksheet.xls                 A    29696  Tue Jan 14 14:25:38 2020
--snipped--

[passports]
\\10.10.1.203\teachers\[obfuscated name]\Paragraph Passport 6.docx                        A    14090  Mon Aug 10 17:25:15 2015
\\10.10.1.203\teachers\[obfuscated name]\Paragraph Passport 7.docx                        A    14257  Mon Aug 10 17:24:35 2015
\\10.10.1.203\teachers\[obfuscated name]\Paragraph Passport.docx                        A    14260  Mon Aug 10 17:24:24 2015
\\10.10.1.203\teachers\[obfuscated name]\[obfuscated name]backup\passport facts about applying.docx      A    20016  Wed M
ay 13 19:57:17 2015
\\10.10.1.203\teachers\[obfuscated name]\Personal\Scotland\[obfuscated name] - Passport.jpg      A    999885  Wed May 18
17:54:22 2022
--snipped--

[tax information]
\\10.10.1.203\administration\Angie's Folder\Tax exemption form for Dell.pdf              A    50387  Mon Dec 13 18:28:41 2021
\\10.10.1.203\administration\[obfuscated name]\Home Depot Tax Exempt Request.doc          A    24576  Tue Feb 21 15:03:34 2012
\\10.10.1.203\administration\[obfuscated name]\Cole County Tax Dist.xls                  A    14336  Mon Aug  9 17:26:22 2010
\\10.10.1.203\administration\Angie's Folder\Miscellaneous\Dell tax.pdf                  A    47810  Wed Dec 15 14:3
7:59 2021
\\10.10.1.203\administration\Angie's Folder\Miscellaneous\Dollar general tax exempt form.pdf      A    71971  Wed Mar  2 2
0:45:34 2022
--snipped--

```

Next, TRU Solutions enumerated web services in the environment with the aim of obtaining sensitive information by exploiting default credentials, security vulnerabilities or misconfigurations.

Testing showed that fourteen (14) web instances allowed unauthenticated address book access. This made it possible to extract user information that could be used to enumerate Active Directory usernames. The affected services were:

```

http://10.10.4.168 - Konica Minolta
http://10.10.1.7 - Konica Minolta
http://10.10.1.6 - Konica Minolta
http://10.10.1.199 - Konica Minolta
http://10.10.1.184 - Konica Minolta
http://10.10.1.180 - Konica Minolta
http://10.10.1.157 - Konica Minolta
http://10.10.1.156 - Konica Minolta
http://10.10.1.154 - Konica Minolta
http://10.10.1.149 - Konica Minolta
http://10.10.1.148 - Konica Minolta
http://10.10.1.146 - Konica Minolta
http://10.10.1.145 - Konica Minolta
http://10.10.1.13 - Konica Minolta

```

The sample output below shows (some of the) obtained user information:

```
[obfuscated name]
[obfuscated name]
[obfuscated name]
[obfuscated name]
[obfuscated name]
[obfuscated name]
[obfuscated name]
[obfuscated name]
[obfuscated name]
[obfuscated name]
--snipped--
```

The address book information could have been used for username guessing. However, this attack was not performed since a full list of domain user accounts had already been obtained via LDAP enumeration.

The following table contains all the accounts for which plaintext credentials were obtained during post-exploitation:

Domain or source IP	User	Domain Administrator	Weak Password
[obfuscated-domain].local	[obfuscated user account]	No	Yes
[obfuscated-domain].local	[obfuscated user account]	Yes	No
[obfuscated-domain].local	[obfuscated user account]	Yes	Yes

The accounts mentioned in the table above should be considered compromised and should have their passwords changed as soon as possible as they could pose a significant threat to the organization's overall environment depending on the account permissions and the security controls implemented.

Internal Network Environment Exposures

This phase of the security assessment focused on the security of network assets within the internal network environment. During this phase, TRU Solutions used a comprehensive set of tools, custom scripts, and manual techniques to thoroughly identify possible threats to the environment. Like a traditional penetration test, all identified threats were tested and validated to evaluate the depth of compromise. Unlike a traditional penetration test, this evaluation of threats was not isolated or limited to a handful of threats, but rather across all threats identified.

 **CRITICAL**

IPv6 DNS Spoofing

 Observation

IPv6 DNS spoofing is possible due to the possibility of deploying a rogue DHCPv6 server on the internal network. Since Microsoft Windows systems prefer IPv6 over IPv4, IPv6-enabled clients will prefer to obtain IP address configurations from a DHCPv6 server when one is available.

During an attack such as the one performed during this assessment, an IPv6 DNS server was assigned to IPv6-enabled clients; however, the IPv6-enabled clients retained their pre-existing IPv4 address configurations - IP address, default gateway, and subnet mask.

 Security Impact

By deploying a rogue DHCPv6 server, an attacker is able to intercept DNS requests by reconfiguring IPv6-enabled clients to use the attacker's system as the DNS server. Such an attack could potentially lead to the successful capture of sensitive information, including user credentials and other information. Resolving all DNS names to an attacker's system results in the victim's system communicating with services such as SMB, HTTP, RDP, MSSQL, etc. all hosted on the attacker's system.

 Top Affected Nodes

TEN (10) NODES AFFECTED		
IP Address	Host Name	Operating System
10.10.0.140	[obfuscated]	Windows Server 2012 R2 Standard 9600 x64
10.10.4.9	[obfuscated]	Windows 10.0 Build 19041 x64
10.10.12.125		Undetected
10.10.0.200		Undetected
10.10.1.12		Undetected
10.10.1.186		Undetected
10.10.1.206		VxWorks
10.10.3.14		Undetected
10.10.3.202		Undetected



Recommendation

Disable IPv6 unless it is required for business operations. As disabling IPv6 could potentially cause an interruption in network services, it is strongly advised to test this configuration prior to mass deployment. An alternative solution would be to implement DHCPv6 guard on network switches. Essentially, DHCPv6 guard ensures that only an authorized list of DHCP servers are allowed to assign leases to clients.



Reproduction Steps

Leveraging the "mitm6" tool within Kali Linux, a user is able to quickly deploy a DHCPv6 server within the local network and assign five-minute leases (by default) to IPv6-enabled clients.



References

→ <https://blog.fox-it.com/2018/01/11/mitm6-compromising-ipv4-networks-via-ipv6/>



Evidence

```
IPv6 address fe80::2187:1 is now assigned to mac=00:07:32:7b:32:65 host= ipv4=
IPv6 address fe80::2187:2 is now assigned to mac=f0:2a:2b:51:fb:3e host=[obfuscated dns]. ipv4=
IPv6 address fe80::2187:3 is now assigned to mac=48:b0:2d:10:89:f0 host=[obfuscated dns]. ipv4=
IPv6 address fe80::2187:4 is now assigned to mac=78:e7:d1:a1:ee:1d host= ipv4=
IPv6 address fe80::2187:6 is now assigned to mac=bc:4a:56:02:16:31 host=[obfuscated dns]. ipv4=
IPv6 address fe80::2187:7 is now assigned to mac=00:07:32:7b:32:65 host= ipv4=
IPv6 address fe80::2187:8 is now assigned to mac=00:1e:67:59:ed:a5 host=[obfuscated dns].[obfuscated domain].local. ipv4=
Sent spoofed reply for wpad.[obfuscated domain].local. to fe80::2187:8
IPv6 address fe80::2187:10 is now assigned to mac=00:9c:02:c1:27:2f host=[obfuscated dns]. ipv4=
Sent spoofed reply for ctldl.windowsupdate.com. to fe80::be4a:56ff:fe02:1631
Sent spoofed reply for ctldl.windowsupdate.com. to fe80::be4a:56ff:fe02:1631
IPv6 address fe80::2187:11 is now assigned to mac=38:ca:84:ce:84:43 host=[obfuscated dns]. ipv4=
IPv6 address fe80::2187:12 is now assigned to mac=00:25:90:65:ad:d4 host=[obfuscated dns].[obfuscated domain].local. ipv4=
IPv6 address fe80::2187:14 is now assigned to mac=00:25:90:69:e2:de host=[obfuscated dns].[obfuscated domain].local. ipv4=
Sent spoofed reply for isatap.[obfuscated domain].local. to fe80::2187:14
IPv6 address fe80::2187:15 is now assigned to mac=00:07:32:7b:32:65 host= ipv4=
Sent spoofed reply for wpad.[obfuscated domain].local. to fe80::2187:12
IPv6 address fe80::2187:16 is now assigned to mac=d0:8e:79:f5:72:2e host=[obfuscated dns]. ipv4=
Sent spoofed reply for teredo.ipv6.microsoft.com. to fe80::2187:14
Sent spoofed reply for dns.msftncsi.com. to fe80::2187:14
IPv6 address fe80::8662:1 is now assigned to mac=00:9c:02:c1:27:2f host=B0AC-[obfuscated dns]. ipv4=
--snipped--
```



CRITICAL

Link-Local Multicast Name Resolution (LLMNR) Spoofing



Observation

Link-Local Multicast Name Resolution (LLMNR) is a protocol used amongst workstations within an internal network environment to resolve a domain name system (DNS) name when a DNS server does not exist or cannot be helpful.

When a system attempts to resolve a DNS name, the system proceeds with the following steps:

1. The system checks its local host file to determine if an entry exists to match the DNS name in question with an IP address.
2. If the system does not have an entry in its local host's file, the system then sends a DNS query to its configured DNS server(s) to attempt to retrieve an IP address that matches the DNS name in question.
3. If the configured DNS server(s) cannot resolve the DNS name to an IP address, the system then sends an LLMNR broadcast packet on the local network to seek assistance from other systems.



Security Impact

Since the LLMNR queries are broadcasted across the network, any system can respond to these queries with the IP address of the DNS name in question. This can be abused by malicious attackers since an attacker can respond to all of these queries with the IP address of the attacker's system. Depending on the service that the victim was attempting to communicate with (e.g. SMB, MSSQL, HTTP, etc.), an attacker may be able to capture sensitive cleartext and/or hashed account credentials. Hashed credentials can, many times, be recovered in a matter of time using computing modern-day computing power and brute-force techniques.



Recommendation

The most effective method for preventing exploitation is to configure the Multicast Name Resolution registry key in order to prevent systems from using LLMNR queries.

- **Using Group Policy:** Computer Configuration\Administrative Templates\Network\DNS Client \Turn off Multicast Name Resolution = Enabled (To administer a Windows 2003 DC, use the Remote Server Administration Tools for Windows 7 - <http://www.microsoft.com/en-us/download/details.aspx?id=7887>)
- **Using the Registry for Windows Vista/7/10 Home Edition only:**
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Windows NT\DNSClient \EnableMulticast



Reproduction Steps

On a system configured with LLMNR, attempt to interact with a DNS name that is known to be invalid (e.g. test123.local). On another system, use a network packet analyzer, such as Wireshark, to inspect the broadcasted traffic on the internal network environment.



References

- <http://blogs.technet.com/b/networking/archive/2008/04/01/how-to-benefit-from-link-local-multicast-name->



Evidence

```
2023-06-11 02:10:27,806 - [*] [LLMNR] Poisoned answer sent to fe80::2187:14 for name [obfuscated dns]
2023-06-11 02:10:27,808 - [*] [LLMNR] Poisoned answer sent to 10.10.8.5 for name [obfuscated dns]
2023-06-11 02:10:28,256 - [*] [LLMNR] Poisoned answer sent to fe80::2187:14 for name [obfuscated dns]
2023-06-11 02:10:28,263 - [*] [LLMNR] Poisoned answer sent to 10.10.8.5 for name [obfuscated dns]
2023-06-11 02:10:28,298 - [*] [LLMNR] Poisoned answer sent to fe80::2187:14 for name [obfuscated dns]
2023-06-11 02:10:28,304 - [*] [LLMNR] Poisoned answer sent to 10.10.8.5 for name [obfuscated dns]
2023-06-11 02:11:27,338 - [*] [LLMNR] Poisoned answer sent to fe80::2187:14 for name wpad
2023-06-11 02:11:27,341 - [*] [LLMNR] Poisoned answer sent to 10.10.8.5 for name wpad
2023-06-11 02:11:27,345 - [*] [LLMNR] Poisoned answer sent to fe80::2187:14 for name wpad
2023-06-11 02:11:39,445 - [*] [LLMNR] Poisoned answer sent to fe80::2187:14 for name wpad
2023-06-11 02:11:39,446 - [*] [LLMNR] Poisoned answer sent to 10.10.8.5 for name wpad
2023-06-11 02:11:39,448 - [*] [LLMNR] Poisoned answer sent to fe80::2187:14 for name wpad
2023-06-11 02:21:36,735 - [*] [LLMNR] Poisoned answer sent to fe80::b111:2fcc:8d38:3faa for name wpad
2023-06-11 02:21:36,739 - [*] [LLMNR] Poisoned answer sent to 10.10.8.5 for name wpad
2023-06-11 02:21:36,739 - [*] [LLMNR] Poisoned answer sent to fe80::b111:2fcc:8d38:3faa for name wpad
2023-06-11 02:22:05,567 - [*] [LLMNR] Poisoned answer sent to fe80::b111:2fcc:8d38:3faa for name [obfuscated dn
s]
2023-06-11 02:22:05,568 - [*] [LLMNR] Poisoned answer sent to 10.10.8.5 for name [obfuscated dns]
2023-06-11 02:22:07,666 - [*] [LLMNR] Poisoned answer sent to fe80::10:10:8:5 for name [obfuscated dns]
2023-06-11 02:22:07,671 - [*] [LLMNR] Poisoned answer sent to 10.10.8.5 for name [obfuscated dns]
2023-06-11 02:22:08,139 - [*] [LLMNR] Poisoned answer sent to fe80::10:10:8:5 for name [obfuscated dns]
2023-06-11 02:22:08,139 - [*] [LLMNR] Poisoned answer sent to 10.10.8.5 for name [obfuscated dns]
--snipped--
```



CRITICAL

Microsoft Windows RCE (BlueKeep)



Observation

During testing, systems were identified that are vulnerable to CVE-2019-0708 (BlueKeep), which is a vulnerability that exists in Microsoft Windows systems. This vulnerability is extremely valuable to an attacker due to the availability of tools and code that could take advantage of this weakness. Successful exploitation of this vulnerability typically results in full access to the exploited system(s).



Security Impact

By exploiting the BlueKeep vulnerability, an attacker could gain full control over the affected system. This typically leads to additional attacks within the organization, including extraction of cleartext passwords and hashes, along with lateral movement within the network. Since exploitation of this vulnerability does not require privilege escalation on the affected system, an attacker would typically have as much access as they need on the compromised system to start enumerating the system.



Top Affected Nodes

ONE (1) NODE AFFECTED

IP Address	Host Name	Operating System
10.10.9.164	[obfuscated]	Windows 5.1



Recommendation

It is recommended to apply security updates on the affected system. Furthermore, the organization should evaluate its patch management program to determine the reason for the lack of security updates. As this vulnerability is a commonly exploited vulnerability and could result in significant access, it should be remediated immediately.



Reproduction Steps

Using a tool such as Metasploit, use the following module:

```
exploit/windows/rdp/cve_2019_0708_bluekeep_rce
```

Provide the necessary IP address information about the source and target, and type "exploit" to launch the exploit. It should be noted that exploitation of this issue could potentially cause an impact on the availability of the remote system.



References



Evidence

[+] 10.10.9.164:3389 120 channel.	- The target is vulnerable. The target attempted cleanup of the incorrectly-bound MS_T
--------------------------------------	--



CRITICAL

NetBIOS Name Service (NBNS) Spoofing



Observation

NetBIOS Name Service (NBNS) is a protocol used amongst workstations within an internal network environment to resolve a domain name system (DNS) name when a DNS server does not exist or cannot be helpful.

When a system attempts to resolve a DNS name, the system proceeds with the following steps:

1. The system checks its local host file to determine if an entry exists to match the DNS name in question with an IP address.
2. If the system does not have an entry in its local hosts file, the system then sends a DNS query to its configured DNS server(s) to attempt retrieving an IP address that matches the DNS name in question.
3. If the configured DNS server(s) cannot resolve the DNS name to an IP address, the system then sends an NBNS broadcast packet on the local network to seek assistance from other systems.



Security Impact

Since the NBNS queries are broadcasted across the network, any system can respond to these queries with the IP address of the DNS name in question. This can be abused by malicious attackers since an attacker can respond to all of these queries with the IP address of the attacker's system. Depending on the service that the victim was attempting to communicate with (e.g. SMB, MSSQL, HTTP, etc.), an attacker may be able to capture sensitive cleartext and/or hashed account credentials. Hashed credentials can, many times, be recovered in a matter of time using computing modern-day computing power and brute-force techniques.



Top Affected Nodes

THREE (3) NODES AFFECTED

IP Address	Host Name	Operating System
10.10.1.47		Undetected
10.10.1.150	[obfuscated]	Unix
10.10.4.9	[obfuscated]	Windows 10.0 Build 19041 x64



Recommendation

The following are some strategies for preventing the use of NBNS in a Windows environment or reducing the impact of NBNS Spoofing attacks:

- Configure the UseDnsOnlyForNameResolutions registry key in order to prevent systems from using NBNS queries ([http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc775874\(v=ws.10\).aspx](http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc775874(v=ws.10).aspx)). Set the registry DWORD to 1.
- Disable the NetBIOS service for all Windows hosts in the internal network. This can be done via DHCP options, network adapter settings, or a registry key.



Reproduction Steps

On a system configured with NBNS, attempt to interact with a DNS name that is known to be invalid (e.g. test123.local). On another system, use a network packet analyzer, such as Wireshark, to inspect the broadcasted traffic on the internal network environment.



References

- <http://markgamache.blogspot.com/2013/01/ntlm-challenge-response-is-100-broken.html>
- <http://support.microsoft.com/kb/313314>
- <http://develnet.blogspot.com/2006/10/disabling-netbios-over-tcpip-via.html>
- [http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc775874\(v=ws.10\).aspx](http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc775874(v=ws.10).aspx)



Evidence

```
2023-06-11 02:11:43,594 - [*] [NBT-NS] Poisoned answer sent to 10.10.1.47 for name WORKGROUP (service: Local Master Browser)
2023-06-11 02:11:57,738 - [*] [NBT-NS] Poisoned answer sent to 10.10.1.150 for name [obfuscated dns] (service: Local Master Browser)
2023-06-11 02:22:06,553 - [*] [NBT-NS] Poisoned answer sent to 10.10.1.150 for name [obfuscated dns] (service: Local Master Browser)
2023-06-11 02:22:06,555 - [*] [NBT-NS] Poisoned answer sent to 10.10.1.47 for name WORKGROUP (service: Local Master Browser)
2023-06-11 02:41:04,676 - [*] [NBT-NS] Poisoned answer sent to 10.10.4.9 for name WPAD (service: Workstation/Redirector)
2023-06-11 02:41:04,677 - [*] [NBT-NS] Poisoned answer sent to 10.10.4.9 for name WPAD (service: Workstation/Redirector)
2023-06-11 02:41:04,681 - [*] [NBT-NS] Poisoned answer sent to 10.10.4.9 for name WPAD (service: Workstation/Redirector)
```



CRITICAL

Outdated Microsoft Windows Systems



Observation

An outdated Microsoft Windows system raises several concerns as the system is no longer receiving updates by Microsoft. This could be a prime target for an attacker as these systems typically do not contain the latest security updates, often times leaving them vulnerable to significant threats.



Security Impact

An exploited Microsoft Windows system could potentially result in an attacker gaining unauthorized access to the affected system(s). Additionally, depending on the similarities in configurations between the compromised system(s) and other systems within the network, an attacker may be able to pivot from this system to other systems and resources within the environment.



Top Affected Nodes

ONE (1) NODE AFFECTED

IP Address	Host Name	Operating System
10.10.3.24	[obfuscated]	Windows 7 Professional 7601 Service Pack 1 x64



Recommendation

Replace outdated versions of Microsoft Windows with operating systems that are up-to-date and supported by the manufacturer.



Reproduction Steps

Use an operating system identification scanner, such as Nmap or Metasploit, to scan the affected targets to identify their specific versions. Alternatively, a network administrator can check the operating system version by logging into the system and viewing the operating system version through the system properties.



References

→ <https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/lifecycle/search/1163>



Evidence

```
SMB      10.10.3.24      445      BORH-SHEILA-NEW  [*] Windows 7 Professional 7601 Service Pack 1 x64 (name:[obfuscated dns]) (domain:[obfuscated domain].local) (signing:True) (SMBv1:True)
      "os": "Windows 7 Professional 7601 Service Pack 1",
```



HIGH

SMBv1 Enabled



Observation

Server Message Block (or SMB) is a communication protocol used in Windows operating systems to communicate with each other over a network. SMB serves an important part in an Active Directory environment as it provides file sharing, printer sharing, and network browsing to machines in the environment. It also allows for processes to communicate with each other using a concept called named pipes, and this is what's known as inter-process communication.



Security Impact

SMBv1 has been depreciated by Microsoft since 2013. Due to this, SMBv1 has become outdated and contains multiple exploits/vulnerabilities that can allow remote control execution on the target machine using this protocol.



Top Affected Nodes

SEVEN (7) NODES AFFECTED		
IP Address	Host Name	Operating System
10.10.0.140	[obfuscated]	Windows Server 2012 R2 Standard 9600 x64
10.10.3.24	[obfuscated]	Windows 7 Professional 7601 Service Pack 1 x64
10.10.1.202	[obfuscated]	Windows Server 2016 Standard 14393 x64
10.10.1.203	[obfuscated]	Windows Server 2016 Standard 14393 x64
10.10.9.164	[obfuscated]	Windows 5.1
10.10.1.150	[obfuscated]	Unix
10.10.1.206		VxWorks



Recommendation

To stay protected from exploits that target vulnerabilities in this protocol, it's recommended to disable SMBv1 in favor of SMBv2/v3.

Microsoft has published documentation on their site about disabling SMBv1, as well as upgrading to SMBv2/v3 in just a few commands.

- **Disabling SMBv1:** <https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/storage/file-server/troubleshoot/detect-enable-and-disable-smbv1-v2-v3?tabs=server#how-to-remove-smbv1-via-powershell>
- **Enabling SMBv2/v3:** <https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/storage/file-server/troubleshoot/detect-enable-and-disable-smbv1-v2-v3?tabs=server#how-to-remove-smbv1-via-powershell>



Reproduction Steps

The **CrackMapExec** tool can be utilized to check whether or not a host has SMBv1 enabled. To do so the following command can be used:

```
crackmapexec smb <ip>
```

This will scan the IP and return a result similar to this:

```
SMB      10.10.10.10      445      SRV      [*] Windows Server 2012 R2 Standard 9600 x64 (name:SRV) (domain:domain.local) (SMBv1:True)
```

The **(SMBv1:True)** part of the response is what indicates whether or not SMBv1 is in use. In this case you can see it shows that this host has SMBv1 enabled since the value is set to **True**.



References

- WannaCry: [What is WANNACRY/WANACRYPTOR? \(cisa.gov\)](https://www.cisa.gov/wannacry)
- Petya: [Petya Destructive Malware Variant Spreading via Stolen Credentials and EternalBlue Exploit | Mandiant](#)
- Bad Rabbit: [Bad Rabbit, Software S0606 | MITRE ATT&CK®](#)



Evidence

```
SMB      10.10.1.202      445      [obfuscated dns]      [*] Windows Server 2016 Standard 14393 x64 (name:[obfuscated dns]) (domain:[obfuscated domain].local) (signing:True) (SMBv1:True)
SMB      10.10.1.150      445      [obfuscated dns]      [*] Unix (name:[obfuscated dns]) (domain:[obfuscated domain]) (signing:False) (SMBv1:True)
SMB      10.10.0.140      445      [obfuscated dns]      [*] Windows Server 2012 R2 Standard 9600 x64 (name:[obfuscated dns]) (domain:[obfuscated domain].local) (signing:True) (SMBv1:True)
SMB      10.10.3.24        445      [obfuscated dns]      [*] Windows 7 Professional 7601 Service Pack 1 x64 (name:[obfuscated dns]) (domain:[obfuscated domain].local) (signing:True) (SMBv1:True)
SMB      10.10.1.203        445      [obfuscated dns]      [*] Windows Server 2016 Standard 14393 x64 (name:[obfuscated dns]) (domain:[obfuscated domain].local) (signing:True) (SMBv1:True)
SMB      10.10.1.206        445      NONE                [*] VxWorks (name:) (domain:) (signing:False) (SMBv1:True)
```



HIGH

Weak Active Directory Account Password Policy



Observation

An Active Directory Domain Password Policy is extremely critical as it is the security settings that many domain user accounts will use when having their accounts configured. These policies include lockout thresholds, lockout durations, minimum characters required, password complexity requirements, and more. During post-exploitation, it was discovered that the password policy configured does not meet security best practices.



Security Impact

A weak password policy can be disastrous for a company in that it allows attackers to exploit the weaknesses of domain user accounts. For example, the lack of a strict account lockout threshold allows malicious attackers to perform numerous login attempts to domain user accounts prior to being locked out. Here are some of the security impacts that can be associated with domain password policies:

- **Minimum password length:** An attacker can take advantage of this by trying weak passwords that exist in the dictionary, such as Apple, Car, Dog, etc. By increasing the minimum password length, an attacker's chances of successfully guessing and/or even cracking (through password cracking techniques) a password is much lower.
- **Lockout threshold:** If the lockout threshold value is too low, an attacker can perform numerous login attempts to the user accounts before locking out an account, which then depends on the lockout duration for unlocking the domain user account.
- **Lockout duration (minutes):** If the account does not remain locked out for a long period of time, then attackers can continuously perform login attempts every X amount of minutes that the account gets unlocked. A small number increases the chances of a successful attack as the disruption to user accounts will be minimum.
- **Lockout observation window (minutes):** By default, Microsoft Windows sets this to 30. This setting indicates how many times someone can perform a login attempt before it subtracts from the lockout threshold. For example, if this setting is set to 30, then this means an attacker can perform one login attempt per 30 minutes, and the lockout threshold will never exceed the value of 1 because the observation window *resets* the counter every 30 minutes.



Recommendation

Use the references to reconfigure your domain's password policy to adhere to security best practices.



Reproduction Steps

Using the Microsoft Windows command line interface (CLI), use the following command to query the domain's password policy:

```
net accounts "domain" /domain
```



References

- <https://blog.devolutions.net/2018/02/top-10-password-policies-and-best-practices-for-system-administrators>
- <https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/microsoft-365/blog/2018/03/05/azure-ad-and-adfs-best-practices-defending-against-password-spray-attacks/>



Evidence

The results showed that the [obfuscated domain].local domain was configured with the following weak password policy setting(s):

```
Reset Account Lockout Counter: 10
Locked Account Duration: 10
```



MEDIUM

Anonymous FTP Enabled



Observation

A file transfer protocol (FTP) service allows users to transfer files to/from remote FTP servers. The FTP service typically allows for setting user credentials, which could include complex usernames and passwords. However, during the case of the assessment, testing identified that anonymous FTP was found present. Anonymous FTP servers allow anyone to log in to the FTP server to browse the files that have been remotely uploaded.



Security Impact

The issue with anonymous FTP is that any individual, including an attacker, could gain remote access to the FTP server and observe the contents within the server. Depending on anonymous permissions, an attacker may also be able to leverage this default, weak configuration in order to store/transmit malicious code.

The exposure of files stored on anonymous FTP servers could present the opportunity for an attacker to compromise the confidentiality and/or integrity of sensitive files that may be deemed for authorized access only.



Top Affected Nodes

TEN (10) NODES AFFECTED		
IP Address	Host Name	Operating System
10.10.0.105		Undetected
10.10.1.11		Undetected
10.10.1.26		Undetected
10.10.1.60		Undetected
10.10.1.221		Undetected
10.10.6.50		Undetected
10.30.1.24		Undetected
10.30.1.29		Undetected
10.30.1.45		Undetected
10.30.1.192		Undetected



Recommendation

If the anonymous FTP server is not required for business operations, consider disabling the service altogether and updating the organization's configuration baseline. The configuration baseline should ensure that unnecessary services are disabled prior to deployment. If the service is required for business operations, consider disabling anonymous authentication and implementing authentication that leverages a complex password.



Reproduction Steps

Using the operating system's built-in FTP client, Metasploit, or Nmap, connect to the affected FTP server(s) using "anonymous/anonymous" (username and password).



Evidence

```
Nmap scan report for 10.30.1.192
Host is up, received user-set (0.0037s latency).
Scanned at 2023-06-11 01:45:56 UTC for 0s

PORT      STATE SERVICE REASON
21/tcp    open  ftp      syn-ack ttl 63
| ftp-anon: Anonymous FTP login allowed (FTP code 230)
| total 1
| -r--r--r--  1 root      printer  4096 Sep 28  2001 CFG-PAGE.TXT
|_-----  1 root      printer    0 Sep 28  2001 Sleep-----
```

```
Nmap scan report for 10.10.0.105
Host is up, received arp-response (0.00043s latency).
Scanned at 2023-06-11 01:45:52 UTC for 3s

PORT      STATE SERVICE REASON
21/tcp    open  ftp      syn-ack ttl 64
| ftp-anon: Anonymous FTP login allowed (FTP code 230)
| -r--r--r-- root root 200 Jan  1 01:08 help
| -r--r--r-- root root 200 Jan  1 01:08 info
| -r--r--r-- root root 200 Jan  1 01:08 prnlog
| -r--r--r-- root root 200 Jan  1 01:08 stat
|_r--r--r-- root root 200 Jan  1 01:08 syslog
MAC Address: 00:26:73:7D:59:8A (Ricoh Company)
```

```
Nmap scan report for 10.10.1.11
Host is up, received arp-response (0.00089s latency).
Scanned at 2023-06-11 01:45:52 UTC for 1s

PORT      STATE SERVICE REASON
21/tcp    open  ftp      syn-ack ttl 64
| ftp-anon: Anonymous FTP login allowed (FTP code 230)
| total 1
| -r--r--r--  1 root      printer  4096 Sep 28  2001 CFG-PAGE.TXT
|_-----  1 root      printer    0 Sep 28  2001 Sleep-----
MAC Address: 30:05:5C:84:49:CA (Brother industries)
```



MEDIUM

Insecure Protocol - FTP



Observation

The File Transfer Protocol (FTP) service is used for client systems to connect to and store and retrieve files. However, FTP does not encrypt the communications between the server and the client, exposing all data in cleartext. Although FTP can negotiate to use TLS, the affected server(s) were not found to negotiate TLS.



Security Impact

Since FTP is cleartext, all of the traffic between the client and the server is exposed in cleartext. This presents the opportunity for an attacker to perform a man-in-the-middle attack and obtain sensitive user credentials as well as file contents. Such valuable information may also be useful for other attacks within the environment.



Top Affected Nodes

ELEVEN (11) NODES AFFECTED

IP Address	Host Name	Operating System
10.10.0.105		Undetected
10.10.1.11		Undetected
10.10.1.26		Undetected
10.10.1.60		Undetected
10.10.1.221		Undetected
10.10.6.50		Undetected
10.30.1.24		Undetected
10.30.1.29		Undetected
10.30.1.45		Undetected
10.30.1.51		Undetected
10.30.1.192		Undetected



Recommendation

Disable the service if it is not needed for business operations. If transferring files is necessary for business operations, then consider implementing Secure FTP (SFTP) as SFTP uses encryption during communications to/from SFTP clients.



Reproduction Steps

Use an FTP client to connect to one of the affected servers on port 21/tcp. The following syntax can be used to attempt connecting to an FTP server:

```
ftp <server_ip_address>
```

Furthermore, if an FTP client does not exist and the available operating system leverages the native telnet command, connectivity can be tested against an FTP server using the following syntax and leveraging the Telnet command:

```
telnet <server_ip_address> 21
```

If the command above works, then the remote server is listening on port 21/tcp.



References

→ <https://www.ipa.go.jp/security/rfc/RFC2577EN.html>



Evidence

```
Nmap scan report for 10.30.1.51
Host is up, received user-set (0.0054s latency).
Scanned at 2023-06-10 18:03:37 UTC for 3496s
Not shown: 993 closed tcp ports (reset)
PORT      STATE SERVICE  REASON
21/tcp    open  ftp      syn-ack ttl 63
```

```
Nmap scan report for 10.10.1.26
Host is up, received arp-response (0.0010s latency).
Scanned at 2023-06-10 13:49:56 UTC for 9s
Not shown: 993 closed tcp ports (reset)
PORT      STATE SERVICE  REASON
21/tcp    open  ftp      syn-ack ttl 64
MAC Address: 30:05:5C:84:44:46 (Brother industries)
```

```
Nmap scan report for 10.30.1.29
Host is up, received user-set (0.0032s latency).
Scanned at 2023-06-10 18:03:37 UTC for 2666s
Not shown: 993 closed tcp ports (reset)
PORT      STATE SERVICE  REASON
21/tcp    open  ftp      syn-ack ttl 63
```

```
Nmap scan report for 10.10.1.11
Host is up, received arp-response (0.0010s latency).
Scanned at 2023-06-10 13:49:56 UTC for 9s
Not shown: 993 closed tcp ports (reset)
PORT      STATE SERVICE  REASON
21/tcp    open  ftp      syn-ack ttl 64
MAC Address: 30:05:5C:84:49:CA (Brother industries)
```



MEDIUM

Insecure Protocol - Telnet



Observation

The telnet service is used for network administrators to perform remote administration of network devices. This service, however, does not enforce encryption and, therefore, exposes all traffic in cleartext.



Security Impact

Since telnet communications are in cleartext, an attacker could perform a man-in-the-middle attack and obtain sensitive information such as user credentials, command outputs, and more. Such valuable information may also be useful for other attacks within the environment.



Top Affected Nodes

EIGHTY-NINE (89) NODES AFFECTED		
IP Address	Host Name	Operating System
10.10.0.54		Undetected
10.10.0.57		Undetected
10.10.0.51		Undetected
10.10.0.58		Undetected
10.10.0.1	[obfuscated]	Undetected
10.10.0.2		Undetected
10.10.0.3		Undetected
10.10.0.34		Undetected
10.10.0.45		Undetected
10.10.0.46		Undetected
10.10.0.50		Undetected
10.40.0.62		Undetected
10.40.0.63		Undetected
10.99.0.1		Undetected
10.99.0.2		Undetected
10.99.0.3		Undetected
10.99.0.34		Undetected
10.99.0.45		Undetected
10.99.0.46		Undetected
10.99.0.50		Undetected
10.99.0.51		Undetected
10.99.0.54		Undetected
10.99.0.55		Undetected
		Undetected

10.99.0.58		Undetected
10.99.0.60		Undetected
10.10.0.60		Undetected
10.10.0.62		Undetected
10.10.0.63		Undetected
10.10.0.105		Undetected
10.10.1.11		Undetected
10.10.1.26		Undetected
10.10.1.60		Undetected
10.10.1.221		Undetected
10.10.6.50		Undetected
10.20.0.1		Undetected
10.20.0.2		Undetected
10.20.0.3		Undetected
10.20.0.34		Undetected
10.20.0.45		Undetected
10.20.0.46		Undetected
10.20.0.50		Undetected
10.20.0.51		Undetected
10.20.0.54		Undetected
10.20.0.55		Undetected
10.20.0.57		Undetected
10.20.0.58		Undetected
10.20.0.60		Undetected
10.20.0.61		Undetected
10.20.0.62		Undetected
10.20.0.63		Undetected
10.30.0.1		Undetected
10.30.0.2		Undetected
10.30.0.3		Undetected
10.30.0.34		Undetected
10.30.0.45		Undetected
10.30.0.46		Undetected
10.30.0.50		Undetected
10.30.0.51		Undetected
10.30.0.54		Undetected
10.30.0.55		Undetected
10.30.0.57		Undetected
10.30.0.58		Undetected
10.30.0.60		Undetected
10.30.0.61		Undetected
10.30.0.62		Undetected
10.30.0.63		Undetected

10.30.1.24		Undetected
10.30.1.29		Undetected
10.30.1.45		Undetected
10.30.1.51		Undetected
10.30.1.192		Undetected
10.40.0.1		Undetected
10.40.0.2		Undetected
10.40.0.3		Undetected
10.40.0.34		Undetected
10.40.0.45		Undetected
10.40.0.46		Undetected
10.40.0.50		Undetected
10.40.0.51		Undetected
10.40.0.54		Undetected
10.40.0.55		Undetected
10.40.0.57		Undetected
10.40.0.58		Undetected
10.40.0.60		Undetected
10.40.0.61		Undetected
10.99.0.61		Undetected
10.99.0.62		Undetected
10.99.0.63		Undetected



Recommendation

Disable the telnet service if it is not required for business operations. If it is required for business operations, consider using an alternative protocol, such as Secure Shell (SSH), to accomplish the same goal with encryption being implemented.



Reproduction Steps

Use a telnet client to connect to a telnet server. Using a network packet analyzer, such as Wireshark, observe the packets originating from the telnet client to discover the cleartext communications.



References

→ <https://isc.sans.edu/diary/Computer+Security+Awareness+Month+-+Day+18+-+Telnet+an+oldie+but+a+goodie/7393>



Evidence

Nmap scan report for 10.20.0.3
Host is up, received user-set (0.00037s latency).

```
Scanned at 2023-06-10 16:17:45 UTC for 24s
Not shown: 997 closed tcp ports (reset)
PORT      STATE SERVICE REASON
23/tcp open  telnet  syn-ack ttl 64
```

```
Nmap scan report for 10.40.0.61
Host is up, received user-set (0.00053s latency).
Scanned at 2023-06-10 21:39:56 UTC for 30s
Not shown: 997 closed tcp ports (reset)
PORT      STATE SERVICE REASON
23/tcp open  telnet  syn-ack ttl 64
```

```
Nmap scan report for 10.30.0.50
Host is up, received user-set (0.00088s latency).
Scanned at 2023-06-10 17:37:38 UTC for 29s
Not shown: 997 closed tcp ports (reset)
PORT      STATE SERVICE REASON
23/tcp open  telnet  syn-ack ttl 64
```

```
Nmap scan report for 10.20.0.58
Host is up, received user-set (0.0029s latency).
Scanned at 2023-06-11 01:45:59 UTC for 0s

PORT      STATE SERVICE REASON
23/tcp open  telnet  syn-ack ttl 64
| telnet-encryption:
|_  Telnet server does not support encryption
```



MEDIUM

SMB NULL Session Authentication



Observation

A Server Message Block protocol (SMB) service allows SMB NULL Session Authentication (i.e. without a username or password). SMB NULL sessions allow anyone to log in to SMB shares to browse the files that have been remotely uploaded.



Security Impact

The issue with SMB NULL sessions is that any individual, including an attacker, could gain remote access to the SMB share and observe the contents. If the NULL session also provides write access, an attacker may also be able to leverage this insecure configuration in order to store/transmit malicious code.

The exposure of files stored on affected SMB shares could present the opportunity for an attacker to compromise the confidentiality and/or integrity of sensitive files that may be deemed for authorized access only.



Top Affected Nodes

ONE (1) NODE AFFECTED

IP Address	Host Name	Operating System
10.10.1.206		VxWorks



Recommendation

If the SMB server is not required for business operations, consider disabling the service altogether and updating the organization's configuration baseline. The configuration baseline should ensure that unnecessary services are disabled prior to deployment. If the service is required for business operations, consider disabling SMB NULL session authentication and implementing authentication that leverages a complex password.



Reproduction Steps

Connect to the affected SMB server(s) using a blank username and a blank password. For the built-in Unix utility smbclient, the syntax is shown below:

```
smbclient -L <IP> --no-pass
```

If the operation succeeds without any errors and smbclient prints information about the configured shares and/or workgroups, the SMB server is affected.

The same checks can also be performed using dedicated scripts that are part of the Metasploit framework or the Nmap portscanning tool.



Evidence

[10.10.1.206]

Anonymous login successful

Sharename	Type	Comment
IPC\$	IPC	
MEMORY_CARD	Disk	FLASH MEMORY PHOTO

Reconnecting with SMB1 for workgroup listing.

Anonymous login successful

Server	Comment
--------	---------

Workgroup	Master
-----------	--------



MEDIUM

SMB Signing Not Required



Observation

Testing identified Microsoft Windows configuration concerns that could potentially result in an increased risk of an attack against Microsoft operating systems within the targeted environment. By default, Microsoft Windows comes pre-installed with several configuration issues that require network administrators to explicitly disable or enable to enhance security. If these options are not modified, then these systems could remain vulnerable to several attacks.

More specifically, the SMB signing feature was not found to be required at the time of testing. SMB signing is a security feature implemented by Microsoft to combat SMB relay attacks. An SMB relay attack occurs when an attacker tricks the victim system into authenticating to the attacker, and the attacker relays those credentials to another system.



Security Impact

Since many organizations use Microsoft Windows and Active Directory environments to manage users, a successful attack against a Microsoft Windows system could potentially expose the organization to other attacks, including privilege escalation and lateral movement. Furthermore, many Microsoft Windows systems share similar configurations due to Group Policy's ability to configure settings on a global scale. A single misconfiguration within Group Policy could present significant threats.

As it relates to SMB signing, a successful SMB relay attack could provide an attacker with access to a system of the attacker's choosing, depending on the permission levels of the authentication credentials being relayed. This could result in remote command execution, access to resources, and more.



Top Affected Nodes

FOUR (4) NODES AFFECTED

IP Address	Host Name	Operating System
10.10.0.220	[obfuscated]	Windows 10.0 Build 17763 x64
10.10.1.150	[obfuscated]	Unix
10.10.1.206		VxWorks
10.10.9.164	[obfuscated]	Windows 5.1



Recommendation

Enforce SMB signing by configuring this across the organization's systems via Group Policy.



Reproduction Steps

Leverage the "smb-security-mode" script within Nmap to scan a system for SMB signing. The following command can be run from a Linux system with Nmap installed:

```
nmap <ip> -p 445 -sS -Pn --script smb-security-mode -v -n
```



References

- <https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/identity/ad-ds/plan/security-best-practices/best-practices-for-securing-active-directory>
- <https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2018/12/05/step-1-identify-users-top-10-actions-to-secure-your-environment/>
- <https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-security-baselines>
- <https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/help/887429/overview-of-server-message-block-signing>



Evidence

```
SMB      10.10.1.150      445      [obfuscated dns]      [*] Unix (name:[obfuscated dns]) (domain:[obfu
scated domain]) (signing:False) (SMBv1:True)
SMB      10.10.0.220      445      [obfuscated dns]      [*] Windows 10.0 Build 17763 x64 (name:[obfuscated dns])
(domain:[obfuscated domain]) (signing:False) (SMBv1:False)
SMB      10.10.1.206      445      NONE      [*] VxWorks (name:) (domain:) (signing:False) (SMBv1:True)
SMB      10.10.9.164      445      [obfuscated dns]      [*] Windows 5.1 (name:[obfuscated dns]) (domain:[obfusc
ated domain].local) (signing:False) (SMBv1:True)
10.10.9.164:(signing:False)
10.10.1.206:(signing:False)
```



LOW

LDAP Permits Anonymous Bind Access



Observation

Lightweight Directory Access Protocol (LDAP) can be used by multiple services when it comes to authenticating users to Active Directory. However, information may also be enumerated from this service in order to provide functionality for certain devices, such as filling in hostnames, domain name information, and more.



Security Impact

A misconfigured LDAP server could unnecessarily expose information to unauthorized individuals, including domain information. Although LDAP is typically exposed only internally, limiting the amount of information that an attacker could get further reduces the risk of a successful attack, even if by a little. LDAP servers may also be useful for enumerating Active Directory Domain User Accounts in certain scenarios, which could be extremely valuable to an attacker that needs such information for performing password attacks against those users.



Top Affected Nodes

TWO (2) NODES AFFECTED

IP Address	Host Name	Operating System
10.10.1.202	[obfuscated]	Windows Server 2016 Standard 14393 x64
10.10.1.203	[obfuscated]	Windows Server 2016 Standard 14393 x64



Recommendation

To disable anonymous bind, add the following line to the "slapd.conf" file:

```
disallow bind_anon
```

Depending on which server operating system your LDAP server is running on, you may also be able to leverage the ASDIEdit tool to add the "DenyUnauthenticatedBind" entry into the configuration. See the reference section for more specific details.



Reproduction Steps

Use the Nmap tool and the "ldap-rootdse" script to evaluate whether or not LDAP servers accept anonymous bind requests. For example, you may run the following commands:

```
nmap <ip_address> -p 389 -sS -Pn -n --script ldap-rootdse
```

If you are able to retrieve results from this command, then that server accepts anonymous LDAP bind requests.



References

→ <https://blog.lithnet.io/2018/12/disabling-unauthenticated-binds-in.html>



Evidence

```
Nmap scan report for 10.10.1.202
Host is up, received arp-response (0.00016s latency).
Scanned at 2023-06-11 01:46:03 UTC for 0s

PORT      STATE SERVICE REASON
389/tcp   open  ldap    syn-ack ttl 128
| ldap-rootdse:
| LDAP Results
|   <ROOT>
|     currentTime: 20230611014603.0Z
|     subschemaSubentry: CN=Aggregate,CN=Schema,CN=Configuration,DC=[obfuscated domain],DC=local
|     dsServiceName: CN=NTDS Settings,CN=[obfuscated dns],CN=Servers,CN=Default-First-Site-Name,CN= Sites,CN=Configuration,DC=[obfuscated domain],DC=local
|     namingContexts: DC=[obfuscated domain],DC=local
|     namingContexts: CN=Configuration,DC=[obfuscated domain],DC=local
|     namingContexts: CN=Schema,CN=Configuration,DC=[obfuscated domain],DC=local
|     namingContexts: DC=DomainDnsZones,DC=[obfuscated domain],DC=local
|     namingContexts: DC=ForestDnsZones,DC=[obfuscated domain],DC=local
|     defaultNamingContext: DC=[obfuscated domain],DC=local
|     schemaNamingContext: CN=Schema,CN=Configuration,DC=[obfuscated domain],DC=local
|     configurationNamingContext: CN=Configuration,DC=[obfuscated domain],DC=local
|     rootDomainNamingContext: DC=[obfuscated domain],DC=local
--snipped--
```



Observation

An egress filtering check was performed as part of the internal network penetration test. This check aims to determine if the internal environment allows excessive access to the public Internet, which could increase the risk of data exfiltration. This check was not performed against a specific in-scope target, but on the public Internet in general to evaluate this risk.

During this check, it was possible to identify access to an excessive number of ports residing on the public Internet. This particular check targeted `scanme.nmap.org`, which is designed for organizations to check whether or not they have access to servers on the public Internet.



Security Impact

Allowing end-users access to excessive services, such as SSH, Telnet, etc. allows for an attacker or end-user to bypass security controls by exfiltrating information through other communication channels. During an attack, an attacker may also leverage this excessive access to establish a command-and-control (C2) server to communicate commands and data back and forth between a compromised system.



Recommendation

Disable access to services that are not required for business operations. Restricting access to only services that are required for business operations allows the organizations to establish more control over communication channels, allowing for inspection of indicators of compromise (IoC) as well as malicious data exfiltration attempts.



Reproduction Steps

With permission, perform a scan against an Internet-facing service that has an excessive amount of ports opened. Analyze the results of the results to determine where services may be visible from the internal network environment.



Evidence

```
Nmap scan report for scanme.nmap.org ([external-ip])
Host is up (0.048s latency).
Other addresses for scanme.nmap.org (not scanned): 2600:3c01::f03c:91ff:fe18:bb2f
Not shown: 992 closed tcp ports (reset)
PORT      STATE      SERVICE
19/tcp    filtered  chargen
22/tcp    open      ssh
80/tcp    open      http
135/tcp   filtered  msrpc
139/tcp   filtered  netbios-ssn
445/tcp   filtered  microsoft-ds
9929/tcp  open      nping-echo
31337/tcp open      Elite

Read data files from: /usr/bin/./share/nmap
# Nmap done at Sun Jun 11 01:44:07 2023 -- 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 2.13 seconds
```

Appendix A: Host Discovery (Operating Systems)

Internal Network Penetration Test

The following table shows the operating systems that were discovered as part of this assessment. It should be noted that the operating system discovery techniques are only able to identify the specific OS versions based on the way the targets respond to various fingerprinting methods. In some cases, all operating systems may not be identifiable at the time of testing.

IP Address	DNS Name	Operating System	Domain
10.10.0.140	[obfuscated]	Windows Server 2012 R2 Standard 9600 x64	
10.10.0.220	[obfuscated]	Windows 10.0 Build 17763 x64	
10.10.0.231	[obfuscated]	Windows 10.0 Build 17763 x64	
10.10.1.150	[obfuscated]	Unix	
10.10.1.202	[obfuscated]	Windows Server 2016 Standard 14393 x64	
10.10.1.203	[obfuscated]	Windows Server 2016 Standard 14393 x64	
10.10.1.206		VxWorks	
10.10.1.207	[obfuscated]	Windows 10.0 Build 17763 x64	
10.10.3.24	[obfuscated]	Windows 7 Professional 7601 Service Pack 1 x64	
10.10.3.78	[obfuscated]	Windows 10.0 Build 19041 x64	
10.10.3.95	[obfuscated]	Windows 10.0 Build 18362 x64	
10.10.3.120	[obfuscated]	Windows 10.0 Build 18362 x64	
10.10.3.121	[obfuscated]	Windows 10.0 Build 19041 x64	
10.10.3.142	[obfuscated]	Windows 10.0 Build 19041 x64	
10.10.3.164	[obfuscated]	Windows 10.0 Build 19041 x64	
10.10.3.196	[obfuscated]	Windows 10.0 Build 19041 x64	
10.10.3.204	[obfuscated]	Windows 10.0 Build 18362 x64	
10.10.3.209	[obfuscated]	Windows 10.0 Build 18362 x64	
10.10.3.230	[obfuscated]	Windows 10.0 Build 18362 x64	
10.10.3.251	[obfuscated]	Windows 10.0 Build 19041 x64	
10.10.4.9	[obfuscated]	Windows 10.0 Build 19041 x64	
10.10.4.24	[obfuscated]	Windows 10.0 Build 19041 x64	
10.10.4.90	[obfuscated]	Windows 10.0 Build 19041 x64	
10.10.4.118	[obfuscated]	Windows 10.0 Build 18362 x64	
10.10.4.147	[obfuscated]	Windows 10.0 Build 19041 x64	
10.10.4.165	[obfuscated]	Windows 10.0 Build 19041 x64	
10.10.4.196	[obfuscated]	Windows 10.0 Build 19041 x64	

10.10.4.203	[obfuscated]	Windows 10.0 Build 19041 x64	
10.10.4.253	[obfuscated]	Windows 10.0 Build 18362 x64	
10.10.5.43	[obfuscated]	Windows 10.0 Build 18362 x64	
10.10.5.116	[obfuscated]	Windows 10.0 Build 19041 x64	
10.10.5.123	[obfuscated]	Windows 10.0 Build 18362 x64	
10.10.5.164	[obfuscated]	Windows 10.0 Build 19041 x64	
10.10.5.245	[obfuscated]	Windows 10.0 Build 19041 x64	
10.10.6.8	[obfuscated]	Windows 10.0 Build 18362 x64	
10.10.6.58	[obfuscated]	Windows 10.0 Build 18362 x64	
10.10.6.121	[obfuscated]	Windows 10.0 Build 18362 x64	
10.10.9.164	[obfuscated]	Windows 5.1	

Appendix B: Identified Nodes Without Ports

During testing, all systems were found to have at least one (1) opened port. As a result, no table will be displayed in this section.

Appendix C: Host Discovery (Opened Ports)

Internal Network Penetration Test

IP Address	DNS Name	Port (Limited to 1000)	Protocol
10.10.0.1	[obfuscated]	22	tcp
10.10.0.1	[obfuscated]	80	tcp
10.10.0.1	[obfuscated]	23	tcp
10.10.0.2		80	tcp
10.10.0.2		22	tcp
10.10.0.2		23	tcp
10.10.0.3		23	tcp
10.10.0.3		22	tcp
10.10.0.3		80	tcp
10.10.0.20		80	tcp
10.10.0.24		515	tcp
10.10.0.24		631	tcp
10.10.0.24		443	tcp
10.10.0.24		80	tcp

10.10.0.24		9100	tcp
10.10.0.34		23	tcp
10.10.0.34		80	tcp
10.10.0.34		22	tcp
10.10.0.40		80	tcp
10.10.0.45		22	tcp
10.10.0.45		23	tcp
10.10.0.45		80	tcp
10.10.0.46		22	tcp
10.10.0.46		23	tcp
10.10.0.46		80	tcp
10.10.0.50		80	tcp
10.10.0.50		22	tcp
10.10.0.50		23	tcp
10.10.0.51		22	tcp
10.10.0.51		80	tcp
10.10.0.51		23	tcp
10.10.0.52		80	tcp
10.10.0.54		22	tcp
10.10.0.54		23	tcp
10.10.0.54		80	tcp
10.10.0.57		23	tcp
10.10.0.57		22	tcp
10.10.0.57		80	tcp
10.10.0.58		23	tcp
10.10.0.58		80	tcp
10.10.0.58		22	tcp
10.10.0.60		22	tcp
10.10.0.60		23	tcp
10.10.0.60		80	tcp
10.10.0.62		22	tcp
10.10.0.62		80	tcp
10.10.0.62		23	tcp
10.10.0.63		22	tcp
10.10.0.63		23	tcp

10.10.0.63		80	tcp
10.10.0.105		9100	tcp
10.10.0.105		21	tcp
10.10.0.105		23	tcp
10.10.0.105		80	tcp
10.10.0.105		139	tcp
10.10.0.105		514	tcp
10.10.0.105		515	tcp
10.10.0.105		631	tcp
10.10.0.105		7443	tcp
10.10.0.105		8080	tcp
10.10.0.140	[obfuscated]	49155	tcp
10.10.0.140	[obfuscated]	49154	tcp
10.10.0.140	[obfuscated]	49153	tcp
10.10.0.140	[obfuscated]	49152	tcp
10.10.0.140	[obfuscated]	8443	tcp
10.10.0.140	[obfuscated]	8088	tcp
10.10.0.140	[obfuscated]	3389	tcp
10.10.0.140	[obfuscated]	1521	tcp
10.10.0.140	[obfuscated]	1099	tcp
10.10.0.140	[obfuscated]	445	tcp
10.10.0.140	[obfuscated]	443	tcp
10.10.0.140	[obfuscated]	135	tcp
10.10.0.140	[obfuscated]	80	tcp
10.10.0.140	[obfuscated]	49156	tcp
10.10.0.140	[obfuscated]	49175	tcp
10.10.0.149		22	tcp
10.10.0.149		5900	tcp
10.10.0.149		443	tcp
10.10.0.149		80	tcp
10.10.0.200		443	tcp
10.10.0.200		22	tcp
10.10.0.200		80	tcp
10.10.0.220	[obfuscated]	5357	tcp
10.10.0.220	[obfuscated]	3389	tcp

10.10.0.220	[obfuscated]	1521	tcp
10.10.0.220	[obfuscated]	1099	tcp
10.10.0.220	[obfuscated]	445	tcp
10.10.0.220	[obfuscated]	443	tcp
10.10.0.220	[obfuscated]	135	tcp
10.10.0.220	[obfuscated]	80	tcp
10.10.0.220	[obfuscated]	8443	tcp
10.10.0.220	[obfuscated]	8088	tcp
10.10.0.231	[obfuscated]	80	tcp
10.10.0.231	[obfuscated]	445	tcp
10.10.0.231	[obfuscated]	3389	tcp
10.10.0.231	[obfuscated]	8009	tcp
10.10.0.231	[obfuscated]	135	tcp
10.10.0.231	[obfuscated]	443	tcp
10.10.0.249		80	tcp
10.10.0.249		22	tcp
10.10.0.249		5900	tcp
10.10.0.249		443	tcp
10.10.0.254		3128	tcp
10.10.0.254		8090	tcp
10.10.0.254		8443	tcp
10.10.0.254		53	tcp
10.10.0.254		25	tcp
10.10.0.254		22	tcp
10.10.0.254		443	tcp
10.10.0.254		1025	tcp
10.10.1.2		515	tcp
10.10.1.2		631	tcp
10.10.1.2		9100	tcp
10.10.1.2		80	tcp
10.10.1.2		443	tcp
10.10.1.6		9100	tcp
10.10.1.6		631	tcp
10.10.1.6		50001	tcp
10.10.1.6		443	tcp

10.10.1.6		515	tcp
10.10.1.6		80	tcp
10.10.1.6		427	tcp
10.10.1.7		9100	tcp
10.10.1.7		80	tcp
10.10.1.7		427	tcp
10.10.1.7		443	tcp
10.10.1.7		515	tcp
10.10.1.7		631	tcp
10.10.1.7		50001	tcp
10.10.1.11		9100	tcp
10.10.1.11		21	tcp
10.10.1.11		23	tcp
10.10.1.11		80	tcp
10.10.1.11		443	tcp
10.10.1.11		515	tcp
10.10.1.11		631	tcp
10.10.1.12		80	tcp
10.10.1.12		443	tcp
10.10.1.12		515	tcp
10.10.1.12		631	tcp
10.10.1.12		9100	tcp
10.10.1.12		8080	tcp
10.10.1.13		9100	tcp
10.10.1.13		515	tcp
10.10.1.13		443	tcp
10.10.1.13		427	tcp
10.10.1.13		80	tcp
10.10.1.13		50001	tcp
10.10.1.13		631	tcp
10.10.1.26		631	tcp
10.10.1.26		515	tcp
10.10.1.26		80	tcp
10.10.1.26		23	tcp
10.10.1.26		21	tcp

10.10.1.26		9100	tcp
10.10.1.26		443	tcp
10.10.1.47		80	tcp
10.10.1.47		443	tcp
10.10.1.47		515	tcp
10.10.1.47		631	tcp
10.10.1.47		8080	tcp
10.10.1.47		9100	tcp
10.10.1.53		515	tcp
10.10.1.53		443	tcp
10.10.1.53		80	tcp
10.10.1.53		9100	tcp
10.10.1.53		631	tcp
10.10.1.60		80	tcp
10.10.1.60		21	tcp
10.10.1.60		23	tcp
10.10.1.60		443	tcp
10.10.1.60		515	tcp
10.10.1.60		631	tcp
10.10.1.60		9100	tcp
10.10.1.145		50001	tcp
10.10.1.145		80	tcp
10.10.1.145		427	tcp
10.10.1.145		443	tcp
10.10.1.145		515	tcp
10.10.1.145		631	tcp
10.10.1.145		9100	tcp
10.10.1.146		50001	tcp
10.10.1.146		9100	tcp
10.10.1.146		631	tcp
10.10.1.146		515	tcp
10.10.1.146		443	tcp
10.10.1.146		427	tcp
10.10.1.146		80	tcp
10.10.1.148		80	tcp

10.10.1.148		50001	tcp
10.10.1.148		9100	tcp
10.10.1.148		631	tcp
10.10.1.148		515	tcp
10.10.1.148		443	tcp
10.10.1.148		427	tcp
10.10.1.149		50001	tcp
10.10.1.149		80	tcp
10.10.1.149		427	tcp
10.10.1.149		443	tcp
10.10.1.149		515	tcp
10.10.1.149		631	tcp
10.10.1.149		9100	tcp
10.10.1.150	[obfuscated]	8080	tcp
10.10.1.150	[obfuscated]	22	tcp
10.10.1.150	[obfuscated]	80	tcp
10.10.1.150	[obfuscated]	139	tcp
10.10.1.150	[obfuscated]	443	tcp
10.10.1.150	[obfuscated]	445	tcp
10.10.1.150	[obfuscated]	1310	tcp
10.10.1.150	[obfuscated]	3128	tcp
10.10.1.150	[obfuscated]	8000	tcp
10.10.1.150	[obfuscated]	8001	tcp
10.10.1.154		50001	tcp
10.10.1.154		9100	tcp
10.10.1.154		631	tcp
10.10.1.154		515	tcp
10.10.1.154		443	tcp
10.10.1.154		427	tcp
10.10.1.154		80	tcp
10.10.1.156		80	tcp
10.10.1.156		50001	tcp
10.10.1.156		9100	tcp
10.10.1.156		631	tcp
10.10.1.156		515	tcp

10.10.1.156		443	tcp
10.10.1.156		427	tcp
10.10.1.157		50001	tcp
10.10.1.157		9100	tcp
10.10.1.157		631	tcp
10.10.1.157		515	tcp
10.10.1.157		443	tcp
10.10.1.157		427	tcp
10.10.1.157		80	tcp
10.10.1.180		9100	tcp
10.10.1.180		631	tcp
10.10.1.180		50001	tcp
10.10.1.180		515	tcp
10.10.1.180		443	tcp
10.10.1.180		427	tcp
10.10.1.180		80	tcp
10.10.1.184		9100	tcp
10.10.1.184		80	tcp
10.10.1.184		427	tcp
10.10.1.184		443	tcp
10.10.1.184		515	tcp
10.10.1.184		631	tcp
10.10.1.184		50001	tcp
10.10.1.186		8290	tcp
10.10.1.186		9100	tcp
10.10.1.186		7	tcp
10.10.1.186		80	tcp
10.10.1.186		515	tcp
10.10.1.186		8080	tcp
10.10.1.198		80	tcp
10.10.1.198		443	tcp
10.10.1.198		5900	tcp
10.10.1.198		22	tcp
10.10.1.199		50001	tcp
10.10.1.199		443	tcp

10.10.1.199		427	tcp
10.10.1.199		515	tcp
10.10.1.199		631	tcp
10.10.1.199		9100	tcp
10.10.1.199		80	tcp
10.10.1.202	[obfuscated]	445	tcp
10.10.1.202	[obfuscated]	593	tcp
10.10.1.202	[obfuscated]	135	tcp
10.10.1.202	[obfuscated]	636	tcp
10.10.1.202	[obfuscated]	88	tcp
10.10.1.202	[obfuscated]	80	tcp
10.10.1.202	[obfuscated]	53	tcp
10.10.1.202	[obfuscated]	3269	tcp
10.10.1.202	[obfuscated]	3268	tcp
10.10.1.202	[obfuscated]	3389	tcp
10.10.1.202	[obfuscated]	464	tcp
10.10.1.202	[obfuscated]	389	tcp
10.10.1.203	[obfuscated]	636	tcp
10.10.1.203	[obfuscated]	8090	tcp
10.10.1.203	[obfuscated]	8080	tcp
10.10.1.203	[obfuscated]	5432	tcp
10.10.1.203	[obfuscated]	5357	tcp
10.10.1.203	[obfuscated]	3389	tcp
10.10.1.203	[obfuscated]	3269	tcp
10.10.1.203	[obfuscated]	3268	tcp
10.10.1.203	[obfuscated]	1102	tcp
10.10.1.203	[obfuscated]	1089	tcp
10.10.1.203	[obfuscated]	1068	tcp
10.10.1.203	[obfuscated]	1034	tcp
10.10.1.203	[obfuscated]	593	tcp
10.10.1.203	[obfuscated]	464	tcp
10.10.1.203	[obfuscated]	445	tcp
10.10.1.203	[obfuscated]	443	tcp
10.10.1.203	[obfuscated]	389	tcp
10.10.1.203	[obfuscated]	135	tcp

10.10.1.203	[obfuscated]	88	tcp
10.10.1.203	[obfuscated]	80	tcp
10.10.1.203	[obfuscated]	53	tcp
10.10.1.206		9111	tcp
10.10.1.206		9290	tcp
10.10.1.206		9101	tcp
10.10.1.206		9102	tcp
10.10.1.206		9110	tcp
10.10.1.206		9220	tcp
10.10.1.206		80	tcp
10.10.1.206		139	tcp
10.10.1.206		443	tcp
10.10.1.206		445	tcp
10.10.1.206		515	tcp
10.10.1.206		631	tcp
10.10.1.206		6839	tcp
10.10.1.206		7435	tcp
10.10.1.206		8080	tcp
10.10.1.206		9100	tcp
10.10.1.207	[obfuscated]	3389	tcp
10.10.1.207	[obfuscated]	2179	tcp
10.10.1.207	[obfuscated]	445	tcp
10.10.1.207	[obfuscated]	135	tcp
10.10.1.221		631	tcp
10.10.1.221		9100	tcp
10.10.1.221		21	tcp
10.10.1.221		23	tcp
10.10.1.221		80	tcp
10.10.1.221		443	tcp
10.10.1.221		515	tcp
10.10.1.221		7627	tcp
10.10.1.225		3306	tcp
10.10.1.225		80	tcp
10.10.3.3		80	tcp
10.10.3.3		111	tcp

10.10.3.4		80	tcp
10.10.3.4		5060	tcp
10.10.3.5		80	tcp
10.10.3.5		111	tcp
10.10.3.10		80	tcp
10.10.3.10		9009	tcp
10.10.3.10		111	tcp
10.10.3.13		80	tcp
10.10.3.13		9009	tcp
10.10.3.13		111	tcp
10.10.3.14		9100	tcp
10.10.3.14		8080	tcp
10.10.3.14		80	tcp
10.10.3.14		443	tcp
10.10.3.14		515	tcp
10.10.3.14		631	tcp
10.10.3.15		8080	tcp
10.10.3.15		22	tcp
10.10.3.15		80	tcp
10.10.3.15		443	tcp
10.10.3.15		4343	tcp
10.10.3.16		5060	tcp
10.10.3.16		80	tcp
10.10.3.20		22	tcp
10.10.3.20		80	tcp
10.10.3.20		111	tcp
10.10.3.20		443	tcp
10.10.3.20		2049	tcp
10.10.3.20		4001	tcp
10.10.3.20		9081	tcp
10.10.3.20		4003	tcp
10.10.3.20		9090	tcp
10.10.3.24	[obfuscated]	135	tcp
10.10.3.24	[obfuscated]	445	tcp
10.10.3.24	[obfuscated]	1433	tcp

10.10.3.24	[obfuscated]	49153	tcp
10.10.3.24	[obfuscated]	49154	tcp
10.10.3.24	[obfuscated]	49152	tcp
10.10.3.24	[obfuscated]	5357	tcp
10.10.3.24	[obfuscated]	3389	tcp
10.10.3.26		4000	tcp
10.10.3.26		8080	tcp
10.10.3.26		8002	tcp
10.10.3.26		8001	tcp
10.10.3.27		9009	tcp
10.10.3.27		80	tcp
10.10.3.27		111	tcp
10.10.3.29		80	tcp
10.10.3.29		5060	tcp
10.10.3.31		111	tcp
10.10.3.31		9009	tcp
10.10.3.31		80	tcp
10.10.3.35		5060	tcp
10.10.3.35		80	tcp
10.10.3.37		80	tcp
10.10.3.37		111	tcp
10.10.3.46		111	tcp
10.10.3.46		80	tcp
10.10.3.49		80	tcp
10.10.3.49		5060	tcp
10.10.3.50		80	tcp
10.10.3.50		111	tcp
10.10.3.55		8080	tcp
10.10.3.55		4343	tcp
10.10.3.55		443	tcp
10.10.3.55		80	tcp
10.10.3.55		22	tcp
10.10.3.57		80	tcp
10.10.3.57		111	tcp
10.10.3.61		9100	tcp

10.10.3.61		80	tcp
10.10.3.61		443	tcp
10.10.3.61		515	tcp
10.10.3.61		631	tcp
10.10.3.61		8080	tcp
10.10.3.62		4001	tcp
10.10.3.62		9081	tcp
10.10.3.62		9090	tcp
10.10.3.62		443	tcp
10.10.3.62		2049	tcp
10.10.3.62		4003	tcp
10.10.3.62		22	tcp
10.10.3.62		80	tcp
10.10.3.62		111	tcp
10.10.3.75		80	tcp
10.10.3.75		111	tcp
10.10.3.75		9009	tcp
10.10.3.78	[obfuscated]	445	tcp
10.10.3.78	[obfuscated]	135	tcp
10.10.3.81		9009	tcp
10.10.3.81		111	tcp
10.10.3.81		80	tcp
10.10.3.85		9009	tcp
10.10.3.85		111	tcp
10.10.3.85		80	tcp
10.10.3.93		111	tcp
10.10.3.93		80	tcp
10.10.3.93		9009	tcp
10.10.3.95	[obfuscated]	135	tcp
10.10.3.95	[obfuscated]	9001	tcp
10.10.3.95	[obfuscated]	445	tcp
10.10.3.95	[obfuscated]	808	tcp
10.10.3.98		111	tcp
10.10.3.98		80	tcp
10.10.3.98		9009	tcp

10.10.3.104		9009	tcp
10.10.3.104		80	tcp
10.10.3.104		111	tcp
10.10.3.118		80	tcp
10.10.3.118		9009	tcp
10.10.3.118		111	tcp
10.10.3.120	[obfuscated]	445	tcp
10.10.3.120	[obfuscated]	135	tcp
10.10.3.121	[obfuscated]	445	tcp
10.10.3.121	[obfuscated]	5357	tcp
10.10.3.121	[obfuscated]	135	tcp
10.10.3.122		9009	tcp
10.10.3.122		80	tcp
10.10.3.122		111	tcp
10.10.3.127		80	tcp
10.10.3.130		80	tcp
10.10.3.130		111	tcp
10.10.3.130		9009	tcp
10.10.3.142	[obfuscated]	135	tcp
10.10.3.142	[obfuscated]	445	tcp
10.10.3.151		80	tcp
10.10.3.151		5060	tcp
10.10.3.164	[obfuscated]	445	tcp
10.10.3.164	[obfuscated]	139	tcp
10.10.3.164	[obfuscated]	135	tcp
10.10.3.164	[obfuscated]	808	tcp
10.10.3.169		80	tcp
10.10.3.169		5060	tcp
10.10.3.170		5060	tcp
10.10.3.170		80	tcp
10.10.3.178		80	tcp
10.10.3.178		5060	tcp
10.10.3.183		80	tcp
10.10.3.183		5060	tcp
10.10.3.196	[obfuscated]	135	tcp

10.10.3.196	[obfuscated]	445	tcp
10.10.3.202		443	tcp
10.10.3.204	[obfuscated]	135	tcp
10.10.3.204	[obfuscated]	445	tcp
10.10.3.204	[obfuscated]	808	tcp
10.10.3.204	[obfuscated]	9001	tcp
10.10.3.209	[obfuscated]	135	tcp
10.10.3.209	[obfuscated]	445	tcp
10.10.3.218		515	tcp
10.10.3.218		80	tcp
10.10.3.218		631	tcp
10.10.3.218		443	tcp
10.10.3.218		9500	tcp
10.10.3.218		9100	tcp
10.10.3.229		5060	tcp
10.10.3.229		80	tcp
10.10.3.230	[obfuscated]	139	tcp
10.10.3.230	[obfuscated]	135	tcp
10.10.3.230	[obfuscated]	445	tcp
10.10.3.236		5060	tcp
10.10.3.236		80	tcp
10.10.3.243		1443	tcp
10.10.3.251	[obfuscated]	135	tcp
10.10.3.251	[obfuscated]	445	tcp
10.10.3.251	[obfuscated]	808	tcp
10.10.4.2		111	tcp
10.10.4.2		9009	tcp
10.10.4.2		80	tcp
10.10.4.9	[obfuscated]	445	tcp
10.10.4.9	[obfuscated]	808	tcp
10.10.4.9	[obfuscated]	139	tcp
10.10.4.9	[obfuscated]	5357	tcp
10.10.4.9	[obfuscated]	135	tcp
10.10.4.22		5060	tcp
10.10.4.22		80	tcp

10.10.4.24	[obfuscated]	135	tcp
10.10.4.24	[obfuscated]	445	tcp
10.10.4.61		80	tcp
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10.10.4.63		80	tcp
10.10.4.63		5060	tcp
10.10.4.70		5060	tcp
10.10.4.70		80	tcp
10.10.4.76		80	tcp
10.10.4.76		5060	tcp
10.10.4.79		80	tcp
10.10.4.79		5060	tcp
10.10.4.84		80	tcp
10.10.4.84		5060	tcp
10.10.4.87		80	tcp
10.10.4.87		5060	tcp
10.10.4.89		5060	tcp
10.10.4.89		80	tcp
10.10.4.90	[obfuscated]	445	tcp
10.10.4.90	[obfuscated]	808	tcp
10.10.4.90	[obfuscated]	135	tcp
10.10.4.92		5060	tcp
10.10.4.92		80	tcp
10.10.4.93		80	tcp
10.10.4.93		5060	tcp
10.10.4.99		443	tcp
10.10.4.109		80	tcp
10.10.4.109		5060	tcp
10.10.4.110		80	tcp
10.10.4.110		5060	tcp
10.10.4.118	[obfuscated]	445	tcp
10.10.4.118	[obfuscated]	135	tcp
10.10.4.120		80	tcp
10.10.4.120		5060	tcp
10.10.4.137		445	tcp

10.10.4.137		808	tcp
10.10.4.137		135	tcp
10.10.4.147	[obfuscated]	445	tcp
10.10.4.147	[obfuscated]	135	tcp
10.10.4.165	[obfuscated]	135	tcp
10.10.4.165	[obfuscated]	445	tcp
10.10.4.168		50001	tcp
10.10.4.168		80	tcp
10.10.4.168		443	tcp
10.10.4.168		515	tcp
10.10.4.168		631	tcp
10.10.4.168		9100	tcp
10.10.4.168		427	tcp
10.10.4.178		808	tcp
10.10.4.178		445	tcp
10.10.4.178		135	tcp
10.10.4.186		80	tcp
10.10.4.186		5060	tcp
10.10.4.187		80	tcp
10.10.4.187		5060	tcp
10.10.4.196	[obfuscated]	135	tcp
10.10.4.196	[obfuscated]	445	tcp
10.10.4.196	[obfuscated]	3389	tcp
10.10.4.203	[obfuscated]	135	tcp
10.10.4.203	[obfuscated]	445	tcp
10.10.4.227		9009	tcp
10.10.4.227		111	tcp
10.10.4.227		80	tcp
10.10.4.253	[obfuscated]	445	tcp
10.10.4.253	[obfuscated]	135	tcp
10.10.5.32		80	tcp
10.10.5.32		5060	tcp
10.10.5.43	[obfuscated]	135	tcp
10.10.5.43	[obfuscated]	445	tcp
10.10.5.67		8088	tcp

10.10.5.67		80	tcp
10.10.5.67		554	tcp
10.10.5.67		5060	tcp
10.10.5.107		443	tcp
10.10.5.107		22	tcp
10.10.5.107		80	tcp
10.10.5.107		5900	tcp
10.10.5.112		8080	tcp
10.10.5.112		443	tcp
10.10.5.112		4343	tcp
10.10.5.112		22	tcp
10.10.5.112		80	tcp
10.10.5.116	[obfuscated]	135	tcp
10.10.5.116	[obfuscated]	445	tcp
10.10.5.116	[obfuscated]	3389	tcp
10.10.5.116	[obfuscated]	80	tcp
10.10.5.123	[obfuscated]	445	tcp
10.10.5.123	[obfuscated]	3389	tcp
10.10.5.123	[obfuscated]	135	tcp
10.10.5.158		443	tcp
10.10.5.158		5060	tcp
10.10.5.158		5061	tcp
10.10.5.158		80	tcp
10.10.5.164	[obfuscated]	445	tcp
10.10.5.164	[obfuscated]	135	tcp
10.10.5.164	[obfuscated]	3389	tcp
10.10.5.172		80	tcp
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10.10.5.172		5060	tcp
10.10.5.172		443	tcp
10.10.5.215		80	tcp
10.10.5.215		22	tcp
10.10.5.215		443	tcp
10.10.5.215		5900	tcp
10.10.5.245	[obfuscated]	135	tcp

10.10.5.245	[obfuscated]	445	tcp
10.10.6.8	[obfuscated]	445	tcp
10.10.6.8	[obfuscated]	80	tcp
10.10.6.8	[obfuscated]	135	tcp
10.10.6.50		515	tcp
10.10.6.50		631	tcp
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10.10.6.50		21	tcp
10.10.6.50		23	tcp
10.10.6.50		80	tcp
10.10.6.50		443	tcp
10.10.6.55		80	tcp
10.10.6.55		22	tcp
10.10.6.55		443	tcp
10.10.6.55		3007	tcp
10.10.6.58	[obfuscated]	445	tcp
10.10.6.58	[obfuscated]	135	tcp
10.10.6.121	[obfuscated]	445	tcp
10.10.6.121	[obfuscated]	3389	tcp
10.10.6.121	[obfuscated]	135	tcp
10.10.9.5		80	tcp
10.10.9.5		5060	tcp
10.10.9.164	[obfuscated]	3389	tcp
10.10.9.164	[obfuscated]	135	tcp
10.10.9.164	[obfuscated]	139	tcp
10.10.9.164	[obfuscated]	445	tcp
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10.10.9.219		5060	tcp
10.10.9.219		80	tcp
10.10.9.221		5060	tcp
10.10.9.221		80	tcp
10.10.9.223		80	tcp
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10.10.9.224		5060	tcp
10.10.9.225		80	tcp
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10.10.9.228		80	tcp
10.10.9.242		80	tcp
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10.10.12.125		1935	tcp
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10.20.0.63		23	tcp

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10.20.0.254		22	tcp
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10.20.0.254		443	tcp
10.20.0.254		3128	tcp
10.20.0.254		8090	tcp
10.20.0.254		8443	tcp
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10.20.1.4		62078	tcp
10.20.1.5		49152	tcp
10.20.1.5		49154	tcp
10.20.1.5		62078	tcp
10.20.1.16		135	tcp
10.20.1.16		139	tcp
10.20.1.16		445	tcp
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10.20.1.85		49153	tcp
10.20.1.85		62078	tcp
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10.30.0.254		8090	tcp

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10.30.1.24		83	tcp
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10.30.1.45		443	tcp
10.30.1.45		515	tcp
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10.30.1.51		80	tcp
10.30.1.51		443	tcp
10.30.1.51		515	tcp
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10.30.1.52		49152	tcp
10.30.1.52		62078	tcp
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10.30.1.54		80	tcp
10.30.1.54		443	tcp
10.30.1.54		515	tcp
10.30.1.54		631	tcp
10.30.1.54		9100	tcp
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10.30.1.59		49152	tcp
10.30.1.59		49153	tcp
10.30.1.60		49152	tcp
10.30.1.66		62078	tcp
10.30.1.66		49152	tcp
10.30.1.66		49154	tcp
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10.30.1.69		443	tcp
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10.30.1.102		49152	tcp
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10.30.1.109		443	tcp
10.30.1.109		4343	tcp
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10.30.1.192		515	tcp

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10.40.0.55		23	tcp
10.40.0.55		22	tcp
10.40.0.55		80	tcp
10.40.0.57		80	tcp

10.40.0.57		22	tcp
10.40.0.57		23	tcp
10.40.0.58		80	tcp
10.40.0.58		23	tcp
10.40.0.58		22	tcp
10.40.0.60		23	tcp
10.40.0.60		22	tcp
10.40.0.60		80	tcp
10.40.0.61		23	tcp
10.40.0.61		22	tcp
10.40.0.61		80	tcp
10.40.0.62		22	tcp
10.40.0.62		80	tcp
10.40.0.62		23	tcp
10.40.0.63		22	tcp
10.40.0.63		80	tcp
10.40.0.63		23	tcp
10.40.0.254		22	tcp
10.40.0.254		25	tcp
10.40.0.254		53	tcp
10.40.0.254		443	tcp
10.40.0.254		1025	tcp
10.40.0.254		3128	tcp
10.40.0.254		8090	tcp
10.40.0.254		8443	tcp
10.40.1.83		3689	tcp
10.40.1.83		7100	tcp
10.40.1.83		62078	tcp
10.40.1.83		5000	tcp
10.40.1.83		7000	tcp
10.40.1.181		631	tcp
10.40.1.181		515	tcp
10.40.1.181		80	tcp
10.99.0.1		80	tcp
10.99.0.1		23	tcp

10.99.0.1		22	tcp
10.99.0.2		80	tcp
10.99.0.2		22	tcp
10.99.0.2		23	tcp
10.99.0.3		80	tcp
10.99.0.3		23	tcp
10.99.0.3		22	tcp
10.99.0.34		23	tcp
10.99.0.34		80	tcp
10.99.0.34		22	tcp
10.99.0.45		80	tcp
10.99.0.45		22	tcp
10.99.0.45		23	tcp
10.99.0.46		80	tcp
10.99.0.46		22	tcp
10.99.0.46		23	tcp
10.99.0.50		22	tcp
10.99.0.50		23	tcp
10.99.0.50		80	tcp
10.99.0.51		22	tcp
10.99.0.51		23	tcp
10.99.0.51		80	tcp
10.99.0.54		22	tcp
10.99.0.54		23	tcp
10.99.0.54		80	tcp
10.99.0.55		23	tcp
10.99.0.55		22	tcp
10.99.0.55		80	tcp
10.99.0.57		23	tcp
10.99.0.57		22	tcp
10.99.0.57		80	tcp
10.99.0.58		80	tcp
10.99.0.58		22	tcp
10.99.0.58		23	tcp
10.99.0.60		22	tcp

10.99.0.60		23	tcp
10.99.0.60		80	tcp
10.99.0.61		22	tcp
10.99.0.61		23	tcp
10.99.0.61		80	tcp
10.99.0.62		80	tcp